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HANDGUN MANUFACTURERS' TORT LIABILITY TO VICTIMS
OF CRIMINAL SHOOTINGS: A SUMMARY OF RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PUSH FOR A
JUDICIAL BAN OF THE
"SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL"
I. INTRODUCTION
Handguns, like a variety of other dangerous products such as alco-
holic beverages and automobiles, enjoy great popular demand in spite
of the fact that their use regularly causes death and serious injury.' The
term "saturday night special" has become the generic designation for a
class of handguns characterized by small size, low cost and easy con-
cealability. 2 The manufacture and marketing of such weapons presents
1. See, e.g., Turley & Harrison, Strict Tort Liability of Handgun Suppliers, 6
HAMLINE L. REV. 285 (1983). Turley and Harrison state:
Every thirteen seconds a new handgun is sold in this country, every
two and a half minutes the product injures someone and three times
every hour it is an instrument of death. The handgun is ranked second
only to motor vehicles as the cause of unnatural deaths in this country.
There are an estimated fifty million handguns in the United States to-
day .... [and] two and [a] half million [are] sold each year .... The
result is some twenty-two thousand handgun deaths annually in this
country alone.
Id. at 285-86 (footnotes omitted) (citing U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, F.B.I. UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS 130 (1980); 2 MORTALITY STATISTICS BRANCH, DIVISION OF VITAL
STATISTICS, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 23 (1981); BUREAU OF AL-
COHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARM STATISTICS (1980); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RE-
PORT OF THE U.S. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME (1979)).
Turley and Harrison argue that holding handgun manufacturers strictly liable in
tort for even a small percentage of these casualties will result in ajudicial ban on
the types of handguns most often abused. See id. at 309-10. But see Kates, Hand-
gun Banning in Light of the Prohibition Experience, in FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: IS-
SUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 139 (D. Kates, Jr. ed. 1984). Professor Kates asserts that
banning handguns to effect a reduction in crime would be analogous to-and as
unsuccessful as-alcohol prohibition during the 1930's and states that
[t]he involvement of liquor and handguns (respectively) in types of
mortality other than intentional homicide is well known. Handguns are
used in about one half of all suicides yearly; liquor is involved in about
one third of them. Handgun accidents take between 200 and 250 lives
per year; liquor is involved in approximately 53,000 accidental deaths
per year, including 25,000 automobile fatalities ..... Overall, hand-
guns are involved in approximately 25,000 violent deaths yearly (homi-
cide, suicide, and accident), while liquor is involved in 75,000. Adding
in fatalities resulting from liquor-related physical ailments, liquor is es-
timated to be involved in about 11 percent of all deaths each year, while
handguns are involved in a little over 1 percent.
Thus, the "life-saving" argument for banning handguns is roughly
comparable to that for banning alcohol.
Id. at 145-46 (footnotes omitted).
2. See Cook, The "Saturday Night Special ": An Assessment ofAlternative Definitions
(1577)
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difficult legal problems.3 In light of the obvious propensity for criminal
use of small handguns and the current widespread concern over the
proliferation of violent crime, there is presently a lively debate regard-
ing the need and ability to ban or control the use of "saturday night
specials." 4
The issue of firearms regulation has been actively debated in Ameri-
can politics since the formation of the United States. 5 The traditional
from a Policy Perspective, 72 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 1735-36 (1981). The term
"saturday night special" was coined to describe small, low caliber, inexpensive
weapons made from inferior quality materials and with poor workmanship. Id.
at 1736. These weapons are generally regarded as having little or no use to
serious target shooters and hunters because they are inaccurate and unreliable.
Id.; see also Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304 Md. 124, 145-46, 497 A.2d 1143, 1153-54
(1985) ("short barrels, light weight, easy concealability, low cost, use of cheap
quality materials, poor manufacture, inaccuracy and unreliability.... render the
Saturday Night Special particularly attractive for criminal use and virtually use-
less for ... legitimate purposes"; McClain, Prohibiting the "Saturday Night Special":
A Feasible Policy Option?, in FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY
201-02 (D. Kates, Jr. ed. 1984) (discussing various definitions for "saturday
night special" based primarily on cost, caliber and barrel length). But see Bruce-
Briggs, The Great American Gun War, in THE ISSUE OF GUN CONTROL 22-23 (T.
Draper ed. 1981) (arguing that "saturday night special" designation is merely
political tool used to encourage public support for banning use of handguns by
particular classes of people).
3. Two extensive collections of research present various points of view on
the legal problems associated with handgun manufacture and regulation. Sympo-
sium on Firearms Legislation and Litigation, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 277 (1983); Second
Amendment Symposium. Rights in Conflict in the 1980's, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 1 (1983).
In addition, a collection of papers presents relatively unbiased public policy re-
search on the issue of gun control. FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: ISSUES OF PUBLIC
POLICY (D. Kates, Jr. ed. 1984). Several collections of articles oppose gun con-
trol as a method of reducing crime. The Issue of Gun Control (T. Draper ed. 1981);
RESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT (D. Kates, Jr. ed.
1979); THE RIGHTS OF GUN OWNERS (A. Gottlieb ed. 1981).
4. See Draper, Preface to THE ISSUE OF GUN CONTROL at 5-6 (T. Draper ed.
1981). The author states:
The pro-control argument is that some kind of regulation of the
private possession of handguns-the weapons most adaptable to close-
range bodily assault-will result in fewer crimes and less human de-
struction. Of those opposed to regulation, some fear that it would lead
inevitably first to a ban on hunting rifles and shotguns and then to
other encroachments on human freedom. Others argue that while the
handgun is the cheapest and most versatile firearm for use in crime, it is
also the most practical means of personal protection against crime. In
this survey of current opinion on the issue of gun control, no disagree-
ment was found on the need to stem the increasing volume of handgun
violence and also to keep down the rising number of Saturday Night
Specials in society. (Most estimates of the number of firearms in pri-
vate hands [in the United States] . . .range from 140 million to 200
million.) Where disagreement begins is over evaluation of evidence
found in books, articles, congressional hearings, and studies to support
the contention that fewer handguns would indeed mean fewer crimes.
Id. (emphasis in original).
5. See Halbrook, Tort Liability For the Manufacture, Sale, and Ownership of Hand-
gusns?, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 351 (1983). The author notes:
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result has been that the right to "keep and bear arms" is protected by
the United States Constitution6 and by most state constitutions. 7 There
exists, however, a vast framework of statutory regulation restricting the
sale, use and importation of firearms in general. 8 Currently, the sale
and use of handguns is subject to a comprehensive federal regulatory
scheme 9 as well as to literally thousands of state and municipal regula-
When the Constitution [of the United States] was proposed in
1787, not a single proponent questioned the individual character of the
right to keep and bear arms. John Adams referred to the right of "arms
in the hands of citizens, to be used at individual discretion ... in private
self defence...." In The Federalist, James Madison referred to "the
advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the peo-
ple of almost every other nation," in contrast with the European king-
doms, where "the governments are afraid to trust the people with
arms."
Insisting on a bill of rights, the Constitution's opponents observed
that "to preserve liberty, it is essential that the whole body of the peo-
ple always possess arms." Patrick Henry stated, "The great object is,
that every man be armed." Samual Adams proposed an amendment
"that the said Constitution be never construed to authorize Congress
to infringe the just liberty of the press .... or to prevent the people of
the United States, who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own
arms. ... "
Id. at 375 (footnotes omitted).
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. II. The second amendment states: "A well-regu-
lated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." Id.
7. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. I, § 1 para. VIII which states: "The right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, but the General Assembly
shall have power to prescribe the manner in which arms may be borne." Id.
8. For a discussion of federal, state and municipal gun control statutes, see
infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the effect of the
second amendment on federal, state, and municipal gun control laws, see Ash-
man, Handgun Control By Local Government, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 97, 110-11 (1983)
(concluding that second amendment restricts federal powers only). But see Got-
tlieb, Gun Ownership. A Constitutional Right, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 113, 136 (1983)(ar-
guing that second amendment is incorporated into fourteenth amendment and
thus binding on states); Spannaus, State Firearm Regulation and the Second Amend-
ment, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 383, 390 (1983) (attempting to reconcile state gun con-
trols with second amendment "right to bear arms").
9. Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-929 (1982); see also Noncomba-
tant's Guide to the Gun Control Fight in THE IssuE OF GUN CONTROL 38 (T. Draper
ed. 1981). Federal gun control legislation generally followed violent periods in
American history. Id. at 41. The National Firearms Act of 1934 (1934 Act) was a
congressional reaction to the "gangster years" of prohibition and regulated,
through taxation, the sale of machine-guns, silencers, and sawed-off shotguns.
Id. The 1934 Act was quickly followed by the Federal Firearms Act of 1938
(1938 Act) which required interstate firearms dealers to be licensed and to keep
records. Id. The Gun Control Act of 1968 (1968 Act) was enacted in the after-
math of the urban riots of the 1960's and the assasinations of President John
Kennedy, Rev. Martin Luther King and Senator Robert Kennedy. Id.
The 1968 Act largely amended and coordinated existing laws. See Research
Project, Federal Firearm Legislation, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 409 (1983). The 1968 Act
focused on assisting state gun control efforts through implementation of a na-
tional licensing system. Id. at 410. In addition, the act attempted to reduce vio-
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tions.1 0 Statistics suggest, however, that legislative controls have been
ineffective in preventing handgun misuse.II
lent crime by limiting the availability of crime-prone firearms. Id. at 410-11.
Thus, the Act criminalized the sale of guns to high risk individuals; banned inter-
state handgun sales and all interstate mail-order gun sales; and prohibited the
importation of non-sporting firearms. Id. The Act also imposed additional fed-
eral criminal sanctions in excess of normal substantive penalties in cases where a
firearm was used in the commission of a crime. Id. at 411.
The 1968 Act has been criticized both by pro-gun and anti-gun groups on
the basis that it has been ineffective in achieving its crime reduction goals. Id.
Recent legislative reform efforts have produced two diametrically opposed bills:
The Firearms Owners Protection Act, S. 1030, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (Mc-
Clure - Volkmer) and The Handgun Crime Control Act, S. 974 & H.R. 3200
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Kennedy - Rodino). Research Project, 6 HAMLINE
L. REV. at 409-10. The McClure-Vokmer Act would amend the 1968 Act to re-
duce restrictions on gun ownership and increase penal sanctions on gun abus-
ers. Id. at 410, 412-16. By contrast, the Kennedy-Rodino Act would strengthen
federal gun ownership restrictions in order to decrease the availability of crime-
prone weapons to high risk groups. Id. at 410, 416-18.
10. See McClain, supra note 2, at 208. Among the federal, state and munici-
pal levels of government, it is estimated that there are more than 20,000 laws
affecting gun use currently in force throughout the United States. Id. Many of
the state and municipal statutes require permits for purchasing or possessing
handguns; prohibit the sale of small handguns that do not conform to statutory
size, caliber and quality minimums; and restrict possession of firearms in general
to high risk individuals. Id. at 208-09. For a discussion of state and local fire-
arms legislation, see generally Research Project, Licensing and Registration Statutes,
6 HAMLINE L. REV. 419 (1983); Research Project, Municipalities and Gun Control:
Handgun Bans, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 431 (1983). For a discussion of a state statute
designed to reduce criminal handgun misuse without registration or confisca-
tion, see Research Project, Minnesota Gun Laws, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 455 (1983).
In recent years, some municipalities, such as San Francisco, have enacted
ordinances banning handguns altogether, following the lead of the Village of
Morton Grove, Illinois. See McClain, supra note 2, at 210; see also Note, Quilici v.
Village of Morton Grove: Ammunition For A National Handgun Ban, 32 DE PAUL L.
REV. 371 (1983) (discussing litigation resulting from ordinance banning hand-
guns which inhibited plaintiff from opening gun store in Morton Grove). But see
Research Project, Municipalities and Gun Control: Handgun Bans, supra, at 431 n.3
(noting Kennesaw, Georgia ordinance requiring all heads of households to
maintain guns and ammunition for self-protection).
11. See Hardy, Legal Restriction of Firearm Ownership as an Answer to Violent
Crime: What Was the Question?, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 391, 395-97 (1983). Mr. Hardy
presents statistics showing increases in violent crime following enactment of lo-
cal gun controls. Id. at 395. Hardy discredits the use of "sociological factors" as
the sole explanation of this phenomenon, citing statistical studies which consid-
ered such factors and still concluded that firearm laws have consistently failed to
measureably reduce crime. Id. at 396 (citing Murray, HANDGUNS, GUN CONTROL
LAwS AND FIREARM VIOLENCE, 23 Soc. PROBS. 81 (1975)); see also Hardy & Kates,
Handgun Availability and the Social Harm of Robbeiy: Recent Data and Some Projections,
in RESTRICTING HANDGUNS, THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT 118, 131-34 (D.
Kates,Jr. ed. 1979) (suggesting that vigorous handgun prohibitions in New York
City and England resulted only in increased illegal gun ownership); McClain,
supra note 2, at 210-14 (citing studies showing that handgun controls have mini-
mal impact on homicide rates).
Commentators have suggested that bans on small, low caliber handguns will
increase the incidences of criminal homicide as criminals substitute "sawed-off"
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Perceiving a need to circumvent the politics of the legislative pro-
cess and in particular to avoid the strong influence of pro-gun lobby
groups,' 2 recent commentators have argued that a defacto ban of small
handguns can be accomplished by persuading the judiciary to apply tort
principles in order to hold gun manufacturers liable to shooting vic-
tims. 1 3 In the wake of this commentary, advocates have urged courts to
hold handgun manufacturers strictly liable to victims of criminal shoot-
versions of larger, more powerful weapons for use in their undiminished crimi-
nal pursuits. See, e.g., McClain, supra note 2, at 213-14; Hardy & Kates, supra, at
398-40 1. Commentators have also suggested that demand for small inexpensive
handguns is so great that decreasing their legitimate supply will only result in an
active black market supplied through theft, smuggling, and illegal production.
See, e.g., Kates, supra note 1, at 158-60; McClain, supra note 2, at 213.
12. See Noncombatants' Guide to the Gun Control Fight, supra note 9, at 42-43.
Opposition to gun control has been suggested to be:
monolithic and embodied in the National Rifle Association. The NRA
[was] ... organized by National Guard officers who had been disturbed
that [their] Civil War recruits couldn't shoot straight. For many years it
has conducted civilian marksmanship and firearms safety programs...
and generally served the interests of hunters, firearms enthusiasts and
collectors, and the firearms industry. Its lobbying arm, the NRA Insti-
tute for Legislative Action, set up in 1975 .... describe[s] itself as "the
strongest, most formidable grassroots 'lobby' in the nation ... with a
professional team of full-time lobbyists, researchers, writers and attor-
neys covering Capitol Hill, the White House and executive agencies."
The NRA position is perfectly clear. NRA is against "discriminatory or
punitive" taxes or fees for buying, owning or using a gun. It is against
... licens[ing] ... because that gives some government functionary the
... [power to determine who may own guns]. It is against regist[ration]
because that would not keep arms out of the hands of undesireables but
would make it possible for guns to be seized "by political authorities or
by persons seeking to overthrow the government by force."
Id.
13. See, e.g., Turley, Manufacturers' and Suppliers' Liability to Handgun Victims,
10 N. Ky. L. REV. 41 (1983). Mr. Turley has been credited with the start of a
concerted effort to expand traditional areas of tort liability to effect a judicial
ban of handguns by making handgun manufacturers strictly liable to shooting
victims. See Comment, Halberstam v. Welch: Economic Justice as a Means of Hand-
gun Control?, 7 AM. J. TR. ADV. 377 (1983)(describing new field of practice as
"the Turley Angle"). Although he has advocated his theories against handgun
manufacturers in a number of recently reported cases, Mr. Turley has not yet
been successful in establishing such liability. See, e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762
F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985), aff'g in part, rev'g in part, Richman v. Charter Arms
Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983); Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp.
1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Mavilia v. Stoeger Ind., 574 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mass.
1983). For a collection of legal commentary on "the Turley Angle," see Sympo-
sium on Firearms Legislation and Litigation, supra note 3; Second Amendment Symposium:
Rights in Conflict in the 1980's, supra note 3.
For other commentaries advocating the need for handgun manufacturers'
strict liability as an effective method of gun control, see, e.g., Turley & Harrison,
supra note 1, at 308-09 (since legislatures are inhibited by pro-gun lobby, courts
are proper place to prevent foreseeable handgun misuse by imposing strict lia-
bility on handgun manufacturers); Note, Manufacturers' Liability to Victims of Hand-
gun Crime: A Common-law Approach, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 771, 799 (1983)
(suggesting shooting victim recovery based on handgun manufacturers' duty to
5
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ings, arguing that manufacturers of such weapons are engaging in an
"ultrahazardous activity" by marketing "unreasonably dangerous prod-
ucts" to the public.' 4 The proponents of these theories contend that
large tort judgments against handgun manufacturers will result in sub-
stantial price increases and the eventual elimination of handgun models
which are prone to criminal and other forms of misuse.' 5
In recent years, these theories have been tested' 6 and rejected in all
reasonably market and design weapons to avoid risks of foreseeable criminal
use).
However, for commentary criticizing the use of tort liability to regulate
handgun misuse, see Santarelli & Calio, Turning the Gun on Tort Law: Aiming at
Courts to Take Products Liability to the Limit, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 471, 507-08
(1983) (handguns are neither defective nor unreasonably dangerous and no prin-
ciple of existing tort law warrants transfer of liability from criminal actor to inno-
cent manufacturer for harm to shooting victim); Note, Handguns and Products
Liability, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1912, 1928 (1984) (arguing handguns which function
properly are not "defective" and handgun manufacturers cannot prevent crimi-
nal misuse, thus, courts should not use product liability law to preempt political
debate over handgun control) [hereinafter cited as Note, Handguns and Products
Liability], cited with approval in Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1208
(N.D. Tex. 1985); see also Hardy, Product Liability and Weapons Manufacture, 20
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 541, 567-68 (1984) (handguns not "unreasonably danger-
ous" under consumer expectation or risk/utility tests of defectiveness, and un-
foreseeable criminal conduct cuts off proximate causation).
14. See, e.g. Richman v Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La.
1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir.
1985). The plaintiff in Richman asserted:
[The murder weapon] was designed, manufactured, and marketed by
Defendant in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to consum-
ers, bystanders, and the general public, because the risk of [foresee-
able] harm associated with marketing the product, as designed, to the
general public, greatly outweighs any socially accepted utility, if any
... . Therefore, Charter Arms Corporation is "strictly liable" to
Plaintiff.
Id. at 194 (quoting and paraphrasing Complaint). The court interpreted this
statement to represent plaintiff's contention that the gun manufacturer should
be held strictly liable to the shooting victim under a products liability theory or,
alternatively, under an ultrahazardous activity theory. Id.
15. See, e.g., Turley & Harrison, supra note 1, at 309-10. The authors state:
It is estimated that perhaps 100 lawsuits premised on theories of
strict liability have been filed during the last two years against handgun
manufacturers and suppliers. Many more will be filed. The plaintiff
will prevail in a number of these suits. Given that a seriously injured
plaintiff may demonstrate economic losses of from five to ten million
dollars ..... [t]he question may no longer be whether and how product
liability laws wll affect handgun suppliers, but rather how soon will the
suppliers self-impose their own destruction.
Id.
16. The first reported case to directly address the issue of handgun manu-
facturers' strict liability to shooting victims is the 1983 decision in Richman v.
Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985). For a discussion of Rich-
man, see infra notes 32-48, 88-106 and accompanying text. There are cases pre-
ceding Richman, however, which held that sellers of firearms may be liable to
shooting victims, but only where the gun was negligently sold to a high risk individ-
1582 [Vol. 31: p. 1577
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jurisdictions in which there are reported cases on this issue. 17 The "ul-
trahazardous activity"' 8 theory is largely rejected because judicial inter-
pretation has generally limited this cause of action to activities related to
land use.19 Theories of products liability20 have also been rejected on
the basis that handguns which are designed to propel bullets with lethal
force are not legally "defective" unless there is something physically
"wrong" with them. 2 ' In one of the most recently reported decisions on
this issue, however, Maryland's highest court acknowledged the limita-
tions of existing strict liability principles and created a unique cause of
action tailored specifically to hold manufacturers of "saturday night spe-
cials" strictly liable to the victims of criminal shootings. 22
This note will first summarize the recent line of cases dealing with
ual. See, e.g., Franco v. Bunyard, 261 Ark. 144, 547 S.W.2d 91, cert. denied, 434
U.S. 835 (1977) (gun dealer sold weapon to escaped convict without checking
identification; convict subsequently murdered hostages).
17. For a discussion of the line of cases after Richman which reject the ex-
tension of products liability and ultrahazardous activity strict liability theories to
manufacturers of non-defective weapons, see infra notes 47-118 and accompany-
ing text.
18. The terms "ultrahazardous" and "abnormally dangerous" are used in-
terchangeably to describe activities that create grave risks to the public despite
the actor's exercise of reasonable care. See, e.g., Martin v. Harrington & Richard-
son, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing imposition of strict
liability where "abnormally dangerous" or "ultrahazardous" activities cause
harm to members of public). See generally R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KAL-
VERN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 572-95 (4th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited
as R. EPSTEIN & C. GREGORY] (presenting cases demonstrating "ultrahazardous
or abnormally dangerous activities").
19. See, e.g., Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304 Md. 124, 133, 497 A.2d 1143, 1147
(1985) (abnormally dangerous activity doctrine not applicable unless alleged
tortfeasor is owner or occupier of land); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250,
1267 (5th Cir. 1985) ("ultrahazardous activity" must be related to land use).
For a discussion of cases applying the ultrahazardous activity doctrine to the
manufacture and marketing of handguns, see infra notes 28-66 and accompany-
ing text.
20. For a discussion of the theoretical and historical basis of modem prod-
ucts liability law, see infra notes 68-86 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of cases applying products liability theories to handgun
manufacture and sale, see infra notes 88-134 and accompanying text.
22. Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985). For a dis-
cussion of the Kelley court's new form of strict liability, see infra notes 120-34 and
accompanying text. For recent commentary discussing the Kelley decision, see
generally Note, Saturday Night Specials, a "Special" Exception in Strict Liability Law,
61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 478 (1986)(arguing in favor of Kelley approach of creat-
ing narrow strict liability cause of action to further social policy goals); Case
Note, Holding Handgun Manufacturers Strictly Liable: The Search For a Theory: Kelley
v. R.G. Indus. Inc., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985)(approach in Kelley
proper to prevent purposeful manufacture and sale of small handguns to
criminals); Casenote, Torts-Strict Liability---Manufacturers' or Marketers' Liability
For the Criminal Use of Saturday Night Specials: A New Common Law Approach, 14 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 149 (1986) (arguing in favor of Kelley holding); Casenote, Kelley v.
R.G. Industries: Gun Control Fires Back, 21 TORTS & INS. L.J. 493 (1986) (favoring
Kelley result but presenting possible statutory and constitutional problems).
1583
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the issue of whether manufacturers of handguns should be held strictly
liable to shooting victims under traditional theories of relief. The first
cases presented demonstrate the rejection of the "ultrahazardous activ-
ity" doctrine as an avenue of relief. Next, cases demonstrating the rejec-
tion of products liability theories will be discussed. Finally, the
Maryland case, Kelley v. R. G. Industries,23 which created a unique cause of
action against certain handgun manufacturers will be discussed.
Against this background, and in light of fundamental principles of
modern tort law, 24 this note will analyze the propriety of a theory of tort
recovery based solely on the manufacture of handguns which are
deemed to be crime-prone. 25 This note will suggest that the decisions
leading to Kelley properly recognized that the appropriate forum in
which to balance the risks against the benefits of small handguns is the
legislature. This note will then argue that the Kelley court's display of
judicial activism, albeit well intentioned, was inconsistent with Mary-
land's legislated public policy because the Maryland legislature, con-
23. 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
24. For a discussion of the evolution of modem tort principles, see W.
PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 492-96 (4th ed. 1971). Early common law tort
cases imposed strict civil liability for all acts which resulted in damages to an-
other. Id. at 492; see, e.g., The Thorns Case, Y.B. Mich. 6 ed. 4, f.7, pl 18 (1466),
reprinted in R. EPSTEIN & C. GREGORY, supra note 18, at 56 (defendant held strictly
liable for trespass resulting from cutting and retrieving thorns which acciden-
tally fell onto plaintiff's land). Tort principles slowly progressed toward recog-
nition of "fault" as a basis of liability. W. PROSSER, supra, at 492; see, e.g., Weaver
v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616), reprinted in R. EPSTEIN & C. GREGORY,
supra note 18, at 61 (no liability for accidental shooting during military exercise
because defendant "had committed no negligence to give occasion to the hurt").
As negligence concepts replaced strict liability during the 19th century, the
concept of "fault" developed to embody the notion that an innocent departure
from an objective standard of reasonableness in the conduct of one's affairs is
sufficient to require the "negligent" actor to compensate his innocent victim.
W. PROSSER, supra, at 493; see also Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292
(1850), reprinted in R. EPSTEIN & C. GREGORY, supra note 18, at 74 (defining stan-
dard of "ordinary care" as that which "prudent and cautious men would use").
Following the evolution of negligence concepts, theories of strict liability re-
emerged during the 20th century. See W. PROSSER, supra, at 494. These tradi-
tional strict liability principles are presently applied in cases dealing with es-
caped animals and in cases where "abnormally dangerous things and activities"
cause injury. Id. at 494, 496-516; see also Baker v. Snell, 2 K.B. 825 (1908), re-
printed in R. EPSTEIN & C. GREGORY, supra note 18, at 564 (dog bite); Spano v.
Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 11, 250 N.E.2d 31, 302 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1969) (blasting
activities).
25. For a discussion of data relating handgun type to types of violent crime,
see McClain, supra note 2, at 204-09. Correlating handgun type with tendency
for criminal use is exceedingly difficult due to conflicting data and is a subject
beyond the scope of this note. See id. For the purpose of analyzing a basis for
handgun manufacturers' tort responsibility, this note will proceed on the as-
sumption that certain handgun manufacturers may have knowledge that their
products are "crime-prone" and possibly "target market" these weapons in high
crime areas. For a discussion of "target marketing," see infra note 168 and ac-
companying text.
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fronted with the same evidence, chose not to ban "saturday night
specials" as a sub-group of socially undesireable firearms. 26
This note will conclude by suggesting that the proper focus in a
case such as Kelley should be on the conduct of the gun manufacturer,
rather than on the physical characteristics of its product. It will argue that
the proper approach should be to allow a neutral factfinder to hear
courtroom evidence in order to determine whether the handgun manu-
facturer acted negligently or recklessly in marketing dangerous products
to criminals and other high risk market segments.2 7 For example, hold-
ing a handgun manufacturer liable to foreseeable victims whose injuries
proximately resulted from the manufacturer's tortious target marketing
practices would be entirely consistent with existing tort principles. This
note will demonstrate however that recent attempts to circumvent the
legislative process and effect a judicial ban on "saturday night specials"
through tortured expansion of strict liability principles represents an im-
proper use of judicial resources.
II. BACKGROUND
A. "ULTRAHAZARDOUS ACTIVITY"
The rationale of strict liability for "ultrahazardous" or "abnormally
dangerous" activities lies in the assumption that certain activities are so
inherently dangerous that they create a risk of great harm to the public
notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable care by the actor.28 A major-
ity of courts have suspended the requirement that a plaintiff demon-
strate negligence when injury was proximately caused by a defendant's
abnormally dangerous act. 29 The injury, however, must fall within the
26. Cf. Patterson v. Geshelschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985). The
Patterson court concluded: "[d]espite the well documented dangers of 'Saturday
Night Specials' and other handguns, not a single state has seen fit to prohibit the
manufacture and sale of handguns. Nor has Congress passed any meaningful
gun-control measures." Id. at 1215.
27. For a discussion of evidence in the Kelley case suggesting that the de-
fendant gun manufacturer knowingly marketed small, crime-prone handguns in
high crime areas, see infra note 127 and accompanying text.
28. See W. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 494. Dean Prosser states:
[T]he courts have in effect recognized a new doctrine, that the de-
fendant's enterprise, while it will be tolerated by the law, must pay its
own way .... This new policy frequently has found expression where
the defendant's activity is unusual and abnormal in the community, and
the danger which it threatens to others is unduly great-and particu-
larly where the danger will be great even though the enterprise is con-
ducted with every possible precaution. The basis of liability is the
defendant's intentional behavior in exposing those in his vicinity to
such a risk.
Id. (footnote omitted).
29. See id. The ultrahazardous activity doctrine emerged from the 19th cen-
tury English case of Rylands v. Fletcher. 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737
(1865), rev'd, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), aff'd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868); see W. PROS-
SER, supra note 24, at 505-06 (discussing Rylands). In Rylands, the defendant con-
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scope of risks anticipated by the actor in light of the abnormally danger-
ous aspects of the act.30 The reason behind this rule is that social policy
considerations and principles of fairness favor recovery for plaintiffs
where: 1) proof of negligence or intent is impossible; 2) the defendant
is benefitting at the risk of grave harm to the public; and 3) as between
the innocent victim and a risk-creating, albeit reasonable, defendant, the
risks of injury belong with the defendant.3 '
structed a large man-made water reservoir on his property. Id. The water from
this tank eventually leaked through the bottom and flowed underground
through abandoned mine shafts into the plaintiff's adjoining property. Id. The
English court found no unreasonable conduct on the part of the defendant, yet
held him liable for plaintiff's damages. Id. In the Exchequer Chamber, Justice
Blackburn stated the principle that anyone who kept anything on his land for his
own purposes which "is likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his
peril." Id. In the House of Lords, this rule was limited by Lord Cairns to cases
where a defendant made a "non-natural" use of his land. Id.
Rylands was initially rejected by a majority of American jurisdictions because
dangerous enterprises were deemed indispensible to the development of a new
country. Id. at 508-09. However, the doctrine now enjoys majority acceptance
as the country's resources have developed to the point where hazardous enter-
prises can be expected to shoulder the burden of providing compensation to the
victims of industrial development. Id. A classic application of this doctrine in
American jurisprudence lies in cases where the use of explosives causes damages
due to shock concussion. See, e.g., Spano v. Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 11, 250
N.E.2d 31, 302 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1969). In Spano, the court stated that where the
defendant's blasting "involves a substantial risk of harm no matter the degree of
care exercised, we perceive no reason for ever permitting a person... to impose
this risk upon nearby persons or property without assuming responsibility there-
fore." Id. at 18, 250 N.E.2d at 35, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 532. The court thus held that
the defendant would be liable to the plaintiffs once plaintiffs proved causation.
Id. at 19, 250 N.E.2d at 35-36, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(2) (1977). Section 519 pro-
vides for strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, stating:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to
liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting
from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent
the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of
which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
Id. § 519. The drafters of the Second Restatement state that designating an activity
"abnormally dangerous" does not render the actor strictly liable for every possi-
ble harm that may result from his actions. Id. comment e. Rather, as comment e
explains, strict liability applies only to harm that is within the scope of the abnor-
mal risk which forms the basis of the liability. Id. For example, transporting
explosives by truck is an abnormally dangerous activity due to the risk that an
explosion may injure people and property in the vicinity. Id. Thus, injuries re-
sulting from such an explosion will create strict liability. Id.; see, e.g., Siegler v.
Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (transporter of gasoline strictly liable
to victim of highway explosion), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973). However, if the
same truck were to simply run over a pedestrian, there would be no liability
unless the truck was negligently driven. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 519
comment e (1977); cf. Madsen v. EastJordan Irr. Co., 101 Utah 552, 125 P.2d
794 (1942) (blaster not strictly liable where vibrations frightened plaintiff's
minks causing them to kill their kittens).
31. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 494-96, 505-16 (explaining
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The first recorded application of the ultrahazardous activity doc-
doctrine and citing examples). The ultrahazardous activities doctrine has been
embodied in the Second Restatement which recognized the imposition of strict lia-
bility where a defendant has "carri[ed] on an abnormally dangerous activity,"
but only in cases where the harm done is such that its very possibility is the
reason for classifying the activity as abnormally dangerous. RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977). For relevant text, see supra note 30.
The Second Restatement sets forth six factors which are weighed to determine
whether an activity is "abnormally dangerous." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 520 (1977). Section 520 provides:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the follow-
ing factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person,
land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable
care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is car-
ried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes.
Id.
Of the first three factors, the drafters state: "A combination of the[se] fac-
tors . . . or sometimes any one of them alone, is commonly expressed by saying
that the activity is 'ultrahazardous,' or 'extra-hazardous.' " Id. comment h. The
drafters further suggest that as the gravity of potential harm increases, a lesser
likelihood of it taking place is required for the activity to be regarded as abnor-
mally dangerous. Id. comment g. The drafters explain that the risk referred to
is the residual risk in an activity after all reasonable precautions have been taken.
Id. comment h. Thus the risk need not be one that no conceivable precautions
or care could eliminate. Id.
Regarding the fourth, "common usage" factor, the drafters stated that:
[a]n activity is a matter of common usage if it is customarily carried on
by the great mass of mankind or by many people in the community....
Thus automobiles have come into such general use that their operation
is a matter of common usage. This, notwithstanding the residue of un-
avoidable risk of serious harm that may result even from their careful
operation, is sufficient to prevent their use from being regarded as an
abnormally dangerous activity.
Id. comment i.
In terms of the "location" test, the drafters suggest that activities such as
blasting, storing explosives, and collecting large quantities of water are not ab-
normally dangerous when carried on in remote areas where persons and valua-
ble property are not constantly at risk. Id. comment j. However, these same
activities would warrant strict liability if carried on in an urban setting, even if
they were socially useful activities. Id. In the drafters' words:
[t]he fact that the activity is inappropriate to the place where it is car-
ried on is a factor of importance in determining whether the danger is
an abnormal one. This is sometimes expressed, particularly in the Eng-
lish cases, by saying there is strict liability for a "non-natural" use of the
defendant's land.
Id.
Lastly, the drafters state that the sixth factor provides a balancing test,
which they articulate as follows:
[an activity's] value to the community may be such that the danger
will not be regarded as ... abnormal ... Thus ... [i]n England ...
11
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trine to the manufacture of handguns was Richman v. Charter Arms Corp. 3 2
In Richman, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the
manufacturer of a "snub-nose" .38 caliber pistol which was used in the
rape/murder of plaintiff's daughter.8 3 The plaintiff's complaint broadly
averred a theory of recovery in strict liability based on the allegation that
the handgun manufacturer had designed and marketed an unreasonably
dangerous product to the general public which foreseeably caused the
death of plaintiff's daughter.3 4 When considering the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment, the district court interpreted plaintiff's con-
tentions to state alternative causes of action, in strict products liability
and under the ultrahazardous activity doctrine.3 5 The court held that
the plaintiff was not entitled to relief under the law of products liability
where constant streams and abundant rains make the storage of water
unnecessary for ordinary or general purposes, a large reservoir in an
inappropriate place has been found to be abnormally dangerous....
[whereas], [i]n west Texas, a dry land whose livestock must have water,
such a reservoir is regarded as 'a natural and common use of the land.'
Id. comment k.
Although many jurisdictions deny that these factors are controlling in their
decisions, all of the courts which have considered whether the manufacture and
sale of handguns is an ultrahazardous activity have incorporated the Second Re-
statement's factors into their analyses. See, e.g., Burkett v. Freedom Arms, 299 Or.
551, 557-58, 704 P.2d 118, 121 (1985) ("this court does not necessarily adhere
to the six factors listed in section 520 .... our focus has been on 'assessing
abnormal hazards by their potential for [great] harm . . . despite the utmost
care' "); Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir.
1984) ("Illinois ... has never explicitly relied upon the Restatement factors in
determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous."); Perkins v. F.I.E.
Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1265, 1268 (5th Cir. 1985) (marketing of handguns to
public falls outside boundaries of Louisiana doctrine but even the Second Restate-
ment would not impose strict liability on such activity).
32. 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Perkins v.
F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
33. 571 F. Supp. at 193-94. On April 4, 1981, Willie Watson obtained a .38
caliber handgun from an aquaintance which he used that night in the kidnap-
ping, robbery, and rape of plaintiff's daughter Kathy Newman, a third year med-
ical student at Tulane University. Id. at 193. Watson then instructed Newman
to dress herself, and as she did so he shot her in the back of the head, killing her.
Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1985). Watson was con-
victed of first degree murder and sentenced to death. Id.; accord State v. Watson,
449 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181 (1985).
34. Richman, 571 F. Supp. at 194. For a discussion of plaintiff's conten-
tions, see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
35. Richman, 571 F. Supp. at 194. The court distinguished the case from
ordinary strict liability cases on the basis that this case involved the intervening
"reprehensible actions" of a third party criminal. Id. at 194-95. The plaintiff
contended that the law nonetheless permitted her to sue and recover from the
defendant gun manufacturer, who then would have the burden of trying to re-
cover from the criminal. Id. at 195. The manufacturer of the handgun defended
on grounds that the intervening third party criminal act was the sole cause of
plaintiff's daughter's injury and death. Id. at 204-05. For a discussion of the
court's rejection of this defense, see infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
1588 [Vol. 31: p. 1577
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 5 [1986], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss5/9
1986] HANDGUN MANUFACTURERS' TORT LIABILITY
in Louisiana and granted summary judgment on that issue.36 The court,
however, refused to deny relief under the ultrahazardous activity doc-
trine.3 7 Since no Louisiana cases specifically precluded the application
of this strict liability theory to the activity of manufacturing firearms,38
the court applied the doctrine to the facts in the Richman record and
determined that genuine factual disputes existed with respect to each of
six factors used by the Second Restatement of Torts for determining when an
activity is "ultrahazardous." '3 9 Thus, the court denied summary judg-
36. Richman, 571 F. Supp. at 195-98. The court found that the handgun
used by Willie Watson was not unreasonably dangerous for its intended use
under Louisiana law. Id. at 197-98. For a discussion of the products liability
analysis in Richman, see infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
37. See 571 F. Supp. at 199-204, 209.
38. Id. at 199. The Richman court stated that Louisiana courts have im-
posed a form of absolute liability when activities are ultrahazardous. Id. In such
cases liability is imposed as a matter of policy when harm results from the risks
inherent with the activity. Id. The court found no Louisiana cases which ad-
dressed the issue of whether activities involving handguns were ultrahazardous.
Id. However, the Richman court found that Louisiana cases have repeatedly
stated in dicta that people handling or distributing highly dangerous substances
such as explosives, electricity and firearms are held to a high degree of care. Id.
(citations omitted). Since distributors of electricity and explosives were subject
to strict liability under Louisiana law, the court concluded that it had "no alter-
native but to examine the defendant's handgun marketing practices" under the
ultrahazardous activities doctrine. Id.
39. Id. at 199-204. The court found support in Louisiana caselaw for apply-
ing the Second Restatement's six factors to determine whether marketing small
handguns is an abnormally dangerous activity. Id. at 199-200 (quoting Langlois
v. Allied Chemical Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971)). For a discus-
sion of relevant Second Restatement provisions, see supra note 31 and accompany-
ing text.
The Richman court stated that resolution of the first two factors, which re-
quire consideration of the risks and likelihood of serious injury resulting from
defendant's marketing practices, hinged on issues of causation most appropri-
ately considered by a jury. 571 F. Supp. at 201. As to the third factor, the court
found legal merit in plaintiff's contention that, as long as defendant continued
to market handguns to the general public, no amount of due care could signifi-
cantly reduce the risk of serious harm to potential shooting victims. Id. As to
the fourth factor, the court stated that "[h]andguns are not an item of 'general
use'; they are an item of extraordinary or abnormal use .... Thus, [as distin-
guished from automobiles and alcoholic beverages], the Court cannot conclude
that the operation of handguns is 'a matter of common usage.' " Id. at 202.
The court went on to find that the Second Restatement's fifth factor, pertaining
to the appropriateness of location, was also supportive of plaintiff's claims. Id.
The court found plaintiff's argument that "there is no place in the United States
where handguns can be safely marketed for sale to the general public" to be
persuasive and not subject to disposal on summary judgment. Id. Lastly, the
court applied the Second Restatement's sixth factor to plaintiff's contention that
"marketing handguns to the general public has no utility at all." Id. The court
found this statement to be an "exaggeration" in light of the fact that the manu-
facture of handguns is socially useful to the extent that it provides jobs and a
means of self defense to the community. Id. However, the court noted that the
gun manufacturers have the ability to spread the risks of their activity to their
customers, stating that "fairness and economic efficiency suggest that the com-
munity would be better off if the defendant's marketing practices were classified
1589
13
Caggiano: Handgun Manufacturers' Tort Liability to Victims of Criminal Shoo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ment to the defendant gun manufacturer on this theory.40
The Richman court also considered the manufacturer's defense that
the criminal use of the handgun was an intervening force which was the
sole proximate cause of the victim's death. 4 1 The court suggested that
criminal use of a handgun is not unforeseeable and therefore does not
break the causal link between the marketer of a gun and the injury in-
flicted by the gun in the hands of a criminal. 4 2 Further, the court found
Louisiana precedent unclear regarding the extent to which actions of a
third person cut off strict liability under the ultrahazardous activity doc-
trine. 43 The court stated that the critical question before it was not to
determine causation, but rather to answer the question: "What are the
legal limits of a handgun manufacturer's liability for the criminal acts of
as ultrahazardous." Id. at 202-04. The court concluded that the defendant's
handgun marketing practices were not so valuable to the community that they
should be automatically exempt from the "ultrahazardous" classification. Id. at
204. The court went on to suggest that the defendant would bear the burden at
trial of demonstrating that its marketing practices were a matter of common us-
age or were of such value to the community as to avoid having the activity classi-
fied as ultrahazardous. Id.
40. 571 F. Supp. at 204, 209.
41. Id. at 204-09. The court stated that "[u]nder Louisiana law, no defend-
ant can be strictly liable for any injury 'caused by the fault of the victim, by the
fault of a third person, or by an irresistible force.' " Id. at 204 (citations omit-
ted). The court went on to cite Louisiana precedent limiting this defense to
cases where the third person fault is the sole cause of the damage. Id. at 205;
accord, Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1979) (adopting the formula-
tion of superseding intervening causation of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 440-453 (1965)).
42. Richman, 571 F. Supp. at 206-08. In considering the issue of causation,
the court relied upon sections 440 and 448 of the Second Restatement. Id. at 206.
Section 440 defines superseding cause as "an act of a third person or other force
which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to an-
other which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965). Section 448 provides that:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime
is a superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom,
although the actor's negligent conduct created a situation which af-
forded an opportunity to the third party to commit such a tort or crime,
unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should
have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created, and
that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit
such a tort or crime.
Id. § 448.
43. Richman, 571 F. Supp. at 206. The court noted that while Louisiana
courts had only applied the Restatement formulation for superseding cause in
negligence cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court had stated in dicta that the for-
mulation is also applicable to strict liability cases. Id. at 207 (citing Olsen v.
Shell Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1979)). Finding no principled distinctions
between negligent and intentional acts of third persons, the Richman court con-
cluded that the dispositive question is not one of sole or superseding causation
but rather whether the gun manufacturer's activities were a "substantial factor"
contributing to the criminal shooting. Id. at 207.
1590 [Vol. 31: p. 1577
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third persons?" 4 4 The trial judge thus denied summary judgment and
immediately certified all questions of law to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.4 5
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit in Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp.4 6 reversed Rich-
man on the ultrahazardous activity issue and remanded with instructions
for the district court to grant summary judgment to the handgun manu-
facturer.4 7 The Fifth Circuit performed an extensive analysis of Louisi-
ana ultrahazardous activity precedent48  and found that the
determination of whether an activity is abnormally dangerous is strictly a
question of law. 4 9 The Fifth Circuit further found that ,a court applying
Louisiana's ultrahazardous activity law must analyze the activity within
the following limitations: 1) the activity must be related to land or im-
movables; 2) the activity itself must cause the injury; and 3) the activity
must be such that substantial participation by third parties is not re-
quired to produce the injury. 50 The court concluded that the activity of
marketing handguns fell "far beyond" these boundaries and held that
marketing handguns was therefore not an abnormally dangerous activity
in Louisiana. 5 1
44. Id. at 208. The court went on to discuss the political nature of the issue
of handgun violence. Id. at 208-09. The court noted that under Louisiana juris-
prudence, "except in the clearest of cases," a judge may shape his application of
the law to the facts by considering the case from the standpoint of a legislator
regulating the matter at issue. Id. at 208 (quoting Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d
1146, 1149 (La. 1983)). The court noted that the Richman case was not one of
"the clearest cases" and that the Louisiana legislature, while permitting the sale
and use of handguns, had not yet considered the issue of strict liability for hand-
gun manufacturers. Id. at 208. The court concluded that this silence, viewed in
connection with the applicability of both Louisiana and the Second Restatement
criteria for ultrahazardous activity, prevented the court from denying plaintiff a
remedy as a matter of law. Id. at 209.
45. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 743 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1984). The Fifth Cir-
cuit in turn certified questions of law to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Id. at
264-65 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 72.1 (1973)). The Louisiana court
declined to accept certification, with two judges dissenting. Perkins v. F.I.E.
Corp., 460 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1984).
46. 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985). Perkins was a consolidated appeal of two
cases in which victims of criminal shootings involving small caliber handguns
sought recovery from handgun manufacturers. Id. at 1252. In the Perkins case,
the district court had granted summary judgment to the defendant on both the
products liability and ultrahazardous activity theories and the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed. Id. at 1252-53.
47. Id. at 1252, 1275.
48. Id. at 1254-69.
49. Id. at 1260.
50. Id. at 1267-68.
51. Id. at 1268. The Fifth Circuit stressed that since liability for ul-
trahazardous activities is "absolute" under Louisiana law, the extension of this
doctrine to manufacturers of inherently dangerous products would make manu-
facturers insurers against all risks associated with their products. Id. at 1269.
Thus, the extension of this liability for handgun manufacture logically could re-
quire its application to many other useful consumer products. Id.
15
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In the time between the Richman and Perkins decisions, the Seventh
Circuit also considered and rejected the application of the ul-
trahazardous activity doctrine to the manufacture and marketing of
handguns. 52 In Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc.,53 the Seventh
Circuit stated that while the use of handguns is "clearly" an ul-
trahazardous activity under Illinois law, the sale of non-defective hand-
guns is not.54 The Seventh Circuit criticized the Richman decision on
the basis that it "blur[red] the distinction between strict liability for sell-
ing unreasonably dangerous products and strict liability for engaging in
ultrahazardous activities by making the sale of a product an activity." '5 5
The court found that imposition of strict liability where a non-negligent
manufacturer produces a non-defective but inherently dangerous hand-
gun would be contrary to Illinois' firearms policy.5 6 In addition, the
52. See Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir.
1984). In Martin, two brothers shot and killed plaintiff's husband with a Har-
rington & Richardson pistol. Id. at 1201. The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois found no support in Illinois law for plaintiff's
theory that the defendant gun manufacturer should be held strictly liable under
either a product liability or ultrahazardous activity theory and dismissed the
wrongful death action for failure to state a cause of action. Id. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed, reasoning that under Illinois law a manufacturer of a non-de-
fective handgun could not be held strictly liable to the victim of a criminal shoot-
ing. Id. at 1204-06.
The plaintiff petitioned for rehearing and motioned to certify questions of
law to the Supreme Court of Illinois. Id. at 1207. The Seventh Circuit denied
rehearing and certification on the basis that recent Illinois precedent was in ac-
cord with its conclusions of law. Id. (citing Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 127 Ill.
App. 3d 676, 469 N.E.2d 339 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (manufacturer of handguns has
no duty under Illinois law to control distribution to general public and is not
strictly liable to shooting victims under products liability or ultrahazardous theo-
ries)); see also Riordan v. Int'l Armament Corp., 132 Ill. App. 3d 642, 477 N.E.2d
1293 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (following Linton and Martin).
53. 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984). The Seventh Circuit addressed the ap-
plicability of both products liability and ultrahazardous activity theories under
Illinois law. Id.
54. Id. at 1203. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the marketing of
handguns to the general public is an abnormally dangerous activity under the
Second Restatement's formulation, noting that Illinois courts rely on these factors
for guidance only. Id. For a discussion of the Second Restatement's formulation,
see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
55. Martin, 743 F.2d at 1204 (emphasis in original). The Seventh Circuit
contrasted the Richman holding with an Illinois trial court opinion in Riordan v.
Int'l Armament Corp., 81 L 27923 (Cir. Ct. Cook County 1983), aff'd, 132 Ill.
App. 3d 642, 477 N.E.2d 1293 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). The Martin court adopted
the Riordan court's reasoning that imposition of strict liability on handgun manu-
facturers based merely on their marketing practices would ultimately make them
insurers against all risks associated with their products. Martin, 743 F.2d at
1204. The court concluded that this is a matter of social policy for the legisla-
ture, not the judiciary, to resolve. Id.
56. Martin, 743 F.2d at 1204. The court noted that Illinois' constitution
and statutes protect its private citizens' right to bear arms:
The State of Illinois regulates, but does not ban, the possession of
handguns.... this express policy is a strong indication that handguns
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court noted that Illinois law would relieve gun manufacturers of all lia-
bility where an intervening force, such as criminal conduct, becomes the
sole cause of the plaintiff's gunshot injury.5 7
The Martin court concluded that Illinois law and public policy pro-
vided no support for a federal court hearing a diversity action to expand
the state's traditional strict liability theories to encompass an "enterprise
liability" standard which could be used to ban or spread the risks associ-
ated with marketing inherently dangerous products.5 8 The Seventh Cir-
should not be considered unreasonably dangerous. . . . Imposing
[strict] liability for the sale of handguns, which would in practice drive
manufacturers out of business, would produce a handgun ban by judi-
cial fiat in the face of the decision of Illinois to allow its citizens to pos-
sess handguns.
Id. (citing Mavilia v. Stoeger Indus., 574 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mass. 1983) (Massa-
chusetts' decision to allow possession of handguns precludes imposing strict lia-
bility on handgun manufacturers under products liability law)).
57. Martin, 743 F.2d at 1205. The court stated that "[w]ith the exception of
Richman, every decision that has considered the foreseeability of criminal uses of
firearms has found that such criminal activity is not reasonably foreseeable." Id.;
see also Bennet v. Cincinnati Checker Cab. Co., 353 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D. Ky.
1973) (pre-1968 Act mail order handgun dealer not liable for criminal misuse by
customers); Adkinson v. Rossi Arms Co., 659 P.2d 1236 (Alaska 1983) (manu-
facturer of gun owes no legal duty and is not liable to victim of fatal shooting by
third person); Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev. Corp., 65 Haw. 58, 647 P.2d 713
(1982) (seller of gun not liable for plaintiff's gunshot injury as proximate cause
was unforeseeable criminal act of third person); Robinson v. Howard Bros., 372
So. 2d 1074 (Miss. 1979) (gun shop was negligent per se in selling handgun to
minor in violation of 1968 Act, but minor's subsequent criminal use was "in-
dependent intervening cause" cutting off gun-shop's liability to shooting vic-
tim); Hulsebosch v. Ramsey, 435 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. 1968) (independent
negligence of third party rifle user barred finding gun manufacturer liable for
plaintiff's injury). But see Franco v. Bunyard, 262 Ark. 144, 547 S.W.2d 91
(1977) (gun dealer who negligently sold gun to escaped convict held liable for
deaths of two hostages resulting from escapee's subsequent criminal acts), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977).
58. Martin, 743 F.2d at 1205. The Martin majority expressed its reluctance
to adopt a theory of strict liability which was premised solely on the justification
that whenever someone is injured, someone must be accountable for the dam-
ages. Id. To adopt such a theory, the court found, would advance the jurispru-
dence of Illinois toward that of the fictional future society called "Litigatia." Id.;
see P. Horton, How Lawsuits Brought the World's Greatest Nation to Ruin, MEDICAL
ECONOMICS, Feb. 21, 1977, at 142. In the fictional land of"Litigatia":
Throughout the economy, new ventures disappeared. New facto-
ries were not built, since no new locations could be found where it was
legally possible to build them. In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court
promulgated the "omnia culpia" doctrine (Lipshitz v. General Motor
Corp.), which in plain language meant that whenever a person suffered
injury through use of a product, all persons or corporations who had
any contact with the product, from raw material to delivery van, were
equally liable to damage claims. It soon became very difficult to get
anyone to make or sell anything, and most people went back to the
ancient art of making things for themselves.
743 F.2d at 1205 (quoting P. Horton, supra, at 149) (emphasis in original).
In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Cudahy asserted that handgun vio-
lence imposed substantial costs on society as a whole. Id. at 1206 (Cudahy, J.,
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cuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant
handgun manufacturer, ruling that Illinois law does not require such
manufacturers to insure the public against all hazards posed by their
products. 59
Perkins, published eight months after Martin, adopted the foregoing
logic as part of its justification for reversing Richman, holding that under
Louisiana law the sale of handguns was not abnormally dangerous. 60
Similarly, one month after Perkins, the Supreme Court of Oregon held in
Burkett v. Freedom Arms 6 ' that even "the design, manufacture, sale and
marketing of a small, easily concealable handgun does not constitute an
abnormally dangerous activity .... "62
The most recently reported decision addressing the issue of
whether marketing handguns is an ultrahazardous activity is Kelley v R. G.
Industries.63 In Kelly, the Maryland Court of Appeals reasoned that the
concurring). He suggested that imposition of strict liability on the sellers and
manufacturers of handguns would represent a proper attempt to shift these
costs onto the users rather than the victims of handguns. Id. (Cudahy, J., con-
curring). Judge Cudahy would not view this liability as an improper "attempt to
drive handguns from the market .. " Id, (Cudahy, J., concurring).
59. Martin, 743 F.2d at 1205-06.
60. See Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1267-69.
61. 299 Or. 551, 704 P.2d 118 (1985). In Burkett, the plaintiff was injured
by a .22 caliber "freedom arms handgun" used by an inmate attempting a jail
break. Id. at 553, 704 P.2d at 119. The handgun was concealable as part of a
belt-buckle and was marketed by the defendant to the general public. Id. The
plaintiffs initially sought recovery under Oregon's products liability law and the
action was dismissed by the United States District Court for the District of Ore-
gon. Id. at 555, 704 P.2d at 120. The plaintiffs amended their complaint to
assert that the defendant's marketing "small, easily concealable handguns" was
an abnormally dangerous activity under Oregon law. Id. The district court de-
clined to rule on a second motion to dismiss pending answers to questions of
law certified to the Supreme Court of Oregon. Id. at 554, 704 P.2d at 120. The
Supreme Court of Oregon adopted the reasoning of Perkins, Martin, and the Sec-
ond Restatement §§ 519-20 to the effect that marketing a dangerous product to the
public is not an abnormally dangerous activity even if the use of such product is.
Id. at 555-57, 704 P.2d at 120-21.
The court further stated that the imposition of strict liability on manufactur-
ers of non-defective products "would amount essentially to the imposition of
enterprise liability.... [which this] court has rejected . .. standing alone as a
justification for the imposition of strict liability. Id. at 558, 714 P.2d at 122 (cit-
ing Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 286 Or. 747, 753, 596 P.2d 1299 (1979)(basis
of strict liability is implied representation of safety, not enterprise liability, thus,
seller of used tractor "as is" held not liable for hidden design defect)).
62. Burkett, 299 Or. at 558, 704 P.2d at 122 (emphasis added).
63. 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985). In Kelley, the plaintiff was shot and
seriously injured with a Rohm Gesellschaft .38 caliber pistol. Id. at 128, 497
A.2d at 1144-45. The plaintiff brought action initially in a state circuit court
seeking recovery under products liability, ultrahazardous activity, and negli-
gence theories. Id. at 129, 497 A.2d at 1145. The defendants had the case re-
moved to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland and
motioned for dismissal for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. at 129, 497 A.2d at 1145. The district
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thrust of the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine under Maryland law
is that the activity creates danger in relation to the area in which it takes
place.64 The court stated that the criminal use of handguns bears no
relation to the manufacturer's ownership or occupancy of land and thus
Maryland's abnormally dangerous activity doctrine provides no vehicle
for recovery where a plaintiff is intentionally shot with a handgun. 65
The Kelley court declared itself to be in accord with the reasoning in
Perkins, Martin and Burkett on this issue.6 6
B. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Until recently, manufacturers of consumer products were substan-
tially shielded from liability when their products malfunctioned or other-
wise caused injury to users or bystanders. 6 7 A plaintiff seeking recovery
in such cases was faced with the substantial burden of proving that the
manufacturer's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury.68
court found no controlling Maryland precedent and certified questions of law to
the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Id.
The Maryland Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff's use of products lia-
bility and ultrahazardous activity theories as a basis of recovery. Id. at 132-39,
497 A.2d at 1146-50. The court proceeded, however, to create a new cause of
action in Maryland, embracing a novel theory of strict liability specifically cre-
ated to dispose of the Kelley case. Id. at 140-59, 497 A.2d at 1150-60. For a
discussion of the Kelley court's products liability analysis, see infra notes 119-20
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the court's new theory of handgun
manufacturers' strict liability, see infra notes 121-34 and accompanying text.
64. Kelley, 304 Md. at 133, 497 A.2d at 1147. The court adopted sections
515-520 of the Second Restatement as the test of whether conduct amounts to be-
ing an ultrahazardous activity in Maryland. Id. For relevant text of sections 519
and 520, see supra notes 30 and 31 respectively. The Kelley court stated, how-
ever, that "regardless ... of whether a handgun might satisfy these factors, ...
[t]his [c]ourt has refused to extend the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine
to instances in which the alleged tortfeasor is not an owner or occupier of land."
Kelley, 304 Md. at 133, 497 A.2d at 1147 (citations omitted).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 133-34, 497 A.2d at 1147. The Kelley court, however, proceeded
to create a new cause of action to specifically hold the manufacturers of "satur-
day night specials" strictly liable to victims of criminal shootings and remanded
the case for a trial on the merits under this new theory. Id. at 140-62, 497 A.2d
at 115. For a discussion this new cause of action in detail, see infra notes 12 1-34
and accompanying text.
67. For discussions of the development of products liability law, see gener-
ally, R. EPSTEIN & C. GREGORY, supra note 18, at 637-39; W. PROSSER, supra note
24, at 641-82.
68. See R. EPSTEIN & C. GREGORY, supra note 18, at 637. The plaintiff in a
products liability action based on negligence first had to demonstrate that he
was a member of class of persons to whom the manufacturer or seller owed a
duty of care. Id. Next, the plaintiff was faced with the burden of proving that the
manufacturer or seller failed to exercise reasonable care to discover or take pre-
cautions to eliminate a particular defect in the product. Id. Finally, the plaintiff
had to establish that the specific defect complained of was the factual and legal
cause of the injury. Id. In such cases, the defendant was held to the standard of
care of the reasonable manufacturer, in light of the circumstances of manufac-
1595
19
Caggiano: Handgun Manufacturers' Tort Liability to Victims of Criminal Shoo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Moreover, the manufacturer enjoyed immunity from liability if the plain-
tiff was not in privity with the manufacturer. 6 9 Gradually, courts recog-
nized that the manufacture and marketing of defective products was
tortious conduct for which the law did not provide an adequate rem-
edy. 70 Thus, the privity defense was eliminated, 71 and many courts be-
gan to expand the application of res ipsa loquitur7 2 and implied
warranty73 theories to facilitate recovery by victims of defective product
ture and customs of the trade. See W. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 644 & n.30.
Manufacturers also owed the consumer a duty to make reasonable quality in-
spections, to test the product and its component parts and to avoid misrepresen-
tative advertising. Id. at 644.
69. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M.&W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.
1842), reprinted in R. EPSTEIN & C. GREGORY, supra note 18, at 413-15 (contrac-
tual duty to properly repair carriages did not extend to carriage driver who was
not party to repair contract). Dean Prosser described Winterbottom as a "fishbone
in the throat of the law," and suggested that courts erroneously derived from
this case the general rule that sellers of products were shielded from tort liability
by privity of contract. See W. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 641. This "error" was
"corrected" in 1916. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E.
1050 (1916) (Cardozo, J.) (car manufacturer owed duty of reasonable care to
consumer who had been invited by manufacturer to purchase automobile which
could foreseeably cause harm if not manufactured, inspected, and tested with
proper care).
70. See R. EPSTEIN & C. GREGORY, supra note 18, at 637-38.
71. See id. (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E.
1050 (1916)).
72. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436
(1944). In Escola, the plaintiff concededly could not demonstrate Coca Cola's
negligence when a bottle of Coke exploded, causing serious injury. Id. at 457,
150 P.2d at 438. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of California affirmed ajudg-
ment for the plaintiff using what has been referred to as "an heroic and tortured
application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine." See R. EPSTEIN & C. GREGORY, supra
note 18, at 640. In a concurring opinion, Judge Traynor stated his preference
for a straightforward rule of "absolute liability" in products liability cases. Es-
cola, 24 Cal. 2d at 461, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring). Judge Traynor
reasoned that the use of res ipsa loquitur and implied warranty theories in prod-
ucts liability cases "circuitous[ly] ... [made] negligence the basis of recovery
[while] impos[ing] what [was] in reality liability without negligence. If public
policy demands that a manufacturer of goods be responsible for their quality
regardless of negligence there is no reason not to fix the responsibility openly."
Id. at 463, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
73. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960). In Henningsen, the plaintiff was injured while driving a new Plymouth
automobile which had a defective steering mechanism. Id. at 369, 161 A.2d at
75. The defendants, the manufacturer and dealer, each denied liability on the
basis that the express warranty protected only plaintiff's husband, the actual
purchaser, who had waived all implied warranties in the purchase contract. Id. at
367, 412, 161 A.2d at 74, 99. The Supreme Court of NewJersey held in favor of
the plaintiff, stating that "modem marketing conditions" require car manufac-
turers to extend an implied warranty of suitability for use by the ultimate pur-
chaser and whomever, in the reasonable contemplation of the parties to the
warranty, might be expected to become a user of the automobile. Id. at 384,
414, 161 A.2d at 84, 100. Plaintiff's lack of privity, therefore, did not preclude
her from suing both the manufacturer and seller of the car for breach of implied
warranties. Id. at 412-16, 161 A.2d at 99-101. For a discussion of the use of
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malfunctions. 74
The conceptual breakthrough in this area was provided in Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products,75 a case in which the California Supreme Court
recognized a specific tort theory of product liability. In Greenman, the
court held that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article
he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection
for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human be-
ing." 76 Under Greenman, the plaintiff's burden was reduced to require
only proof "that he was injured while using the [product] in a way it was
intended to be used as a result of a defect in design and manufacture of
which plaintiff was not aware that made the [product] unsafe for its in-
tended use." 77 The court stated that "[t]he purpose of such liability is
to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are
borne by the manufacturers . . . rather than by the injured persons
"78
The Restatement (Second) of Torts subsequently defined a "special"
products liability cause of action which was essentially in accord with
Greenman.79 The Second Restatement has been construed to recognize
three types of product defects which can trigger strict liability of a seller
or manufacturer: 1) a manufacturing or assembly flaw; 2) a design de-
warranty as a basis for a products liability action, see generally W. PROSSER, supra
note 24, at 650-56.
74. See R. EPSTEIN & C. GREGORY, supra note 18, at 637-38.
75. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). In Greenman, a
"Shopsmith" which was manufactured with insufficiently strong "set screws"
caused a piece of wood to suddenly fly loose, injuring plaintiff. Id. at 59-60, 377
P.2d at 898-99, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698-99. Judge Traynor, writing for a unanimous
court, established and applied his preferred theory of strict products liability
which he had espoused in Escola. Id. at 62-64, 377 P.2d at 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr.
at 700-01. For a discussion of Escola, see supra note 71.
76. Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
77. Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
78. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A states,
in pertinent part:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product For Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to lia-
bility for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and it does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
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fect; and 3) an inadequate warning.8 0 In addition to being "defective,"
the Second Restatement requires that the product be "unreasonably dan-
gerous" and cause physical harm to the "ultimate user or consumer, or
to his property." 8'
The Second Restatement's use of the language "defective and unrea-
sonably dangerous" has created difficulties in interpretation, and a split
of opinion has developed concerning the proper use of reasonability
concepts injury trials in which strict liability concepts must be applied. 8 2
This is particularly a problem in design defect cases in which the jury is
asked to evaluate the manufacturer's design process without considering
the reasonableness of the designer.83 Some states have attempted to
circumvent this problem by developing a "risk/utility" test for design
defectiveness. 84 In applying this test, the jury is asked to determine
whether the design feature responsible for the injury could have been
80. See, e.g., Patterson v. Geselschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985)
("defective distribution" of handguns is not recognized under Texas products
liability law). For a discussion of Patterson, see infra notes 107-18 and accompa-
nying text. See also Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S
LJ. 30, 33-34 (1974) (product defects include improper design, manufacture or
inadequate warning); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability For Products, 44
Miss. L.J. 825, 830, 841-43 (1973) (defining "defective" products as those not in
their intended condition, improperly designed, or unaccompanied by adequate
warnings).
Manufacturing flaws are defects specific to individual articles of manufac-
ture that enter the marketplace in an unintended unsafe condition due to poor
quality of parts, workmanship or both. See Wade, supra, at 830, 841. The test for
defectiveness in these cases generally centers on whether the product functioned
properly for its intended use. Id.; see also Keeton, supra, at 37. In order to re-
cover, the consumer must show that the product did not perform as a reasonable
consumer would have expected and, as a result, the product caused injury (the
"consumer expectation" test). Wade, supra, at 841. A design defect occurs
when a whole product line lacks a design element which could have been feasibly
incorporated into the product to increase its overall safety. Id.
Defective warning cases generally arise where the product embodies risks
which are known to the manufacturer but are not obvious to the consumer to
whom the manufacturer has provided inadequate warnings, all of which contrib-
ute to unexpected injury during use of the product. Id. at 842. In cases where
useful products are unavoidably unsafe, such as vaccines and blood, courts have
made a determination of the product's risks versus its social utility to determine
whether the product should have been marketed at all. Id. A fourth category of
product includes products which are inherently and obviously dangerous as
designed, even when manufactured flawlessly. Id. at 842. General knowledge
and common expectations may render products such as liquor and cigarettes
non-defective despite their foreseeable risks of harm. Id.
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l).
82. See Wade, supra note 80, at 830-33.
83. Id.; see also Cronin v.J.B.E. Olsen Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153,
104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972) (prohibiting the use of Second Restatement's "unreason-
ably dangerous" language in jury instructions).
84. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). For a discussion of the Barker theory of design defect, see
infra note 99-102 and accompanying text.
1598 [Vol. 3 1: p. 1577
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 5 [1986], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss5/9
1986] HANDGUN MANUFACTURERS' TORT LIABILITY
improved or eliminated without compromising the overall safety of the
product.8 5 Under this rationale, if the design could feasibly have been
made safer for its intended use, then the risks of harm exceed the prod-
ucts' utility and it is defective.8 6
Against this background, the Richman court held that handgun man-
ufacturers are not strictly liable to victims of criminal shootings under
Louisiana's products liability law. 8 7 The court first found that under
Louisiana law, a product is defective when it is unreasonably dangerous
in the context of "all reasonably foreseeable uses." 88 The district court
went on to state that products are unreasonably dangerous when they
pose greater risks than reasonable consumers expect, or when reason-
able sellers would refuse to market products if apprised of their attend-
ant risks. 89 The court concluded that handguns are not unreasonably
dangerous products because their inherently dangerous nature is obvi-
ous to the reasonable consumer. 90 The court further concluded that
marketing handguns to the general public is not unreasonable conduct
because the Louisiana legislature had refused to ban handguns despite
the obvious risks they pose. 9 1
85. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431-32, 573 P.2d 443,
455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 237-38 (1978).
86. Id.
87. Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 198 (E.D. La. 1983),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
For a discussion of the facts of Richman, see supra note 33 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of commentary advocating and opposing the use of prod-
ucts liability law to hold gun manufacturers liable to shooting victims, see supra
note 13 and accompanying text.
88. Richman, 571 F. Supp. at 195 (emphasis in original) (quoting Le Bouef
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985, 989 (5th Cir. 1980)).
89. Richman, 571 F. Supp. at 195.
90. Id. at 197. The Richman court stated:
[C]ommon sense requires the Court to find that the risks involved in
marketing handguns for sale to the general public are not greater than
reasonable consumers expect. Every reasonable consumer that
purchases a handgun doubtless knows that the product can be used as a
murder weapon. This knowledge, however, in no way deters reason-
able consumers from purchasing handguns .... [W]arnings are not
likely either to alter consumer buying behavior or to reduce handgun
violence. The plaintiff's reliance on the "consumer expectation" the-
ory is therefore misplaced.
Id.
91. Id. at 198. The court stated:
[T]he Louisiana legislature has neither enacted a statute banning the
sale of handguns to the general public nor adopted ajoint resolution to
amend the Constitution to that effect. Given the prominence of the
handgun issue in public debates .... [t]he inference the court should
draw from this is clear: the legislature does not think handgun manu-
facturers act unreasonably (are negligent per se) when they market
their product to the general public .... Any other view . . .would
appear to be implausible.
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The decision of the Richman court that handgun manufacturers are
not liable to victims of criminal shootings under Louisiana's products
liability law was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit in Perkins.9 2 In Perkins, how-
ever, the plaintiffs argued that Louisiana precedent supported applica-
tion of a "risk/utility" test to find that small concealable handguns are
unreasonably dangerous because their inherent propensity to cause seri-
ous injury outweighs their social utility.9 3 The Fifth Circuit rejected this
argument because the Louisiana precedent relied upon by plaintiffs
mentioned "risk/utility" only in dicta.94 The Perkins court found that
Louisiana caselaw mandated a "consumer expectation" standard of
product defectiveness. 95 The court reasoned that even if a general
risk/utility test was applicable, there must be "something wrong" with
the product before the test can be applied.9 6 The court concluded that
it is common knowledge that small, concealable handguns are designed to
be dangerous weapons and as such, they are not defective simply because
their misuse causes human injury.9 7
In dicta, however, the Perkins court explored the propriety of apply-
ing a specific risk/utility test enunciated by the California Supreme
Court in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.9 8 to the manufacture and market-
ing of small handguns.9 9 The Barker test was developed as an alternative
to the consumer expectation standard in design defect cases.10 0 Under
92. Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1252 (5th Cir. 1985), aff'g in
part, rev'g in part, Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. La.
1983).
93. Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1271. The plaintiffs in Perkins relied on Hunt v. City
Stores, 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980). In Hunt, an escalator manufacturer was held
strictly liable for failure to warn of a latent defect to a boy who was injured after
his shoe lodged in a moving escalator. Id. at 587, 590. The Louisiana Supreme
Court stated that when deciding whether a product is unreasonably dangerous
for normal use, "a balancing test is mandated: if the likelihood and gravity of
harm outweigh the benefits and utility of the manufactured product, the product
is unreasonably dangerous." Id. at 589.
94. Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1271-72. The Perkins court stated that "[a]lthough
the [Hunt] Court spoke in terms of a risk/utility test, the analysis it actually ap-
plied was that of the consumer expectation test and its attendant duty-to-warn
rule." Id. at 1272.
95. Id. at 1272, 1274.
96. Id. at 1272 (citing Note, Handguns and Products Liability, supra note 13).
97. Id. at 1272-73.
98. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
99. Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1273-75.
100. See Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 426-27, 573 P.2d at 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
The court stated:
[I]n design defect cases, a court may properly instruct a jury that a
product is defective in design if (1) the plaintiff proves that the product
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) the plain-
tiff proves that the product's design proximately caused injury and the
defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevent factors, that on balance
the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inher-
ent in such design.
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the Barker risk/utility test, the plaintiff must make a prime facie showing
that the allegedly defective product proximately caused the injury.' 0 '
The burden then shifts to the manufacturer "to prove that the benefits
of the product's design outweigh its risk of danger."' 0 2 The Perkins
court reasoned that this language in Barker could remove from the plain-
tiff the burden of demonstrating a functional defect in the handgun
before the court could apply the risk/utility analysis. 10 3 The Perkins court
reasoned, however, that proximate causation would be difficult to estab-
lish where intervening criminal use of a handgun caused plaintiff's in-
jury. 10 4 The court also noted that the California legislature has
expressly precluded California courts from applying the Barker
risk/utility test to firearms. 10 5 The Perkins court concluded, however,
Id., quoted in Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1273.
101. Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1273.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1274. The Perkins court noted, however, that even the Barker
court used language which could be construed to limit defective design liability
to cases in which there is something functionally "wrong" with the product so as
to stop short of making the manufacturer an insurer for all injuries which may
result from the use of its product." Id. at 1273 n.64, quoting Barker, 20 Cal. 3d
at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238. Accord, Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc.,
304 Md. 124, 138, 497 A.2d 1143, 1149 (1985) (nothing "wrong" with handgun
that fires with lethal force); Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d
1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1984) (handguns analagous to alcoholic beverages which
are dangerous but not defective).
104. Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1274.
105. Id. at 1273-74 n.64. In response to the Barker decision, the California
legislature passed an act, precluding the use of a risk/utility test on firearms,
which provides in relevent part: "In a products liability action, no firearm or
ammunition shall be deemed defective in design on the basis that the benefits of
the product do not outweigh the risk of injury posed by its potential to cause
serious injury, damage, or death when discharged." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.4
(West 1985), quoted in Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1274 n.64. For an analysis of the
potential use of the Barker risk/utility test in a products liability case against a
handgun manufacturer, see generally Comment, A Shot at Stricter Controls: Strict
Liability for Gun Manufacturers, 15 PAC. L.J. 171 (1984) (acknowledging California
statutory bar but advocating use of Barker analysis against handgun manufactur-
ers in other states).
But see Francis v. Diamond Int'l Corp., Nos. CV82-11-1279 & CV83-02-0215
(Ohio C.P. 1983), aff"d, No. CV84-09-111 (Ohio Ct. App. 12 Dist., Dec. 30,
1985) (available Feb. 14, 1985, on LEXIS, States Library, Ohio file)). In Francis, a
worker shot three members of a management team, using a pistol loaded with
hollow point bullets, just after being given notice of termination. Id. (LEXIS), at
6. In a products liability action against both the gun and ammunition manufac-
turers, the trial court refused to allow the jury to determine whether the gun and
bullets were defective under a Barker analysis:
The [Barker] weighing test should be applied where the product
could be made safer with an alternative design, and not where the prod-
uct is in itself dangerous.... Thejury should not be allowed to specu-
late on whether handguns are beneficial to society; that is a policy
matter for the legislature to decide.
Id., slip op. at 4 quoted in Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1274 n.68. The Ohio Court of
Appeals affirmed and added: "[I]t is this court's conclusion that a jury could not
1601
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that regardless of the merits of the risk/utility test, the Barker rule could
not provide the plaintiffs in Perkins with a remedy because Louisiana had
not yet adopted such a standard. 10
6
The issue of handgun manufacturers' strict liability for criminal
shootings was finally tested in a general risk/utility jurisdiction in Patter-
son v Gesellschaft.10 7 In Patterson, the plaintiff argued that a "saturday
night special" was defective under the Texas risk/utility doctrine "be-
cause handguns.., pose risks of injury and death that 'far outweigh' any
social utility they may have."' 0 8 In response to this claim, the district
court determined that Texas had adopted the Second Restatement's posi-
tion that manufacturers who place products on the market "in a defec-
tive condition unreasonably dangerous" are subject to strict liability for
injuries caused by the products. 10 9 The court next explained that this
standard does not make the manufacturer an insurer against all risks
presented by its products.' 10 Rather, the court stated that the standard
provides relief only when a product is "defective."' 1 '
The district court in Patterson further explained that the risk/utility
test as applied in Texas design defect cases is based on the premise that
the product's design embodied a defective element which could have
been remedied or improved in a technically and economically feasible
manner before the product went to market."12 The court reasoned that
since handguns are designed specifically to discharge bullets with lethal
force, this design feature could not be eliminated to increase the overall
safety of the product. 113 The court concluded that the Texas risk/utility
test was inapplicable to products which are obviously and inherently
dangerous, notwithstanding the fact that they create substantial risks of
determine that the design of all handguns and all hollow point bullets embodies 'excessive
preventable danger'. " Francis, No. CV84-09-1 11, slip op. at 6 (emphasis added).
106. Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1274. The Perkins court reasoned that "[n]o court
in this jurisdiction has ever applied a general risk/utility analysis to a well-made
product that functioned precisely as it was designed to do [sic]." Id.
107. 608 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
108. Id. at 1208. The Patterson court stressed at the outset that it dismissed
the case on the basis that the plaintiffs' claims were "totally without merit.... a
misuse of tort law, [and] a baseless and tortured extension of products liability
principles." Id.
109. Id. at 1209 (citations omitted).
110. Id.
111. Id. The Patterson court explained that a product can be defective only
"in the sense that something is wrong with it." Id. The court went on to explain
that the product liability formulation set forth in the Second Restatement contem-
plates only three types of defect: manufacturing defect, insufficient warning,
and design defect. Id. For a discussion of these types of product defects, see
supra note 79 and accompanying text.
112. Patterson, 608 F. Supp. at 1210; cf. Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey,
609 S.W.2d 743, 749 (Tex. 1980) (under Texas' risk/utility test, defective de-
signs judged against technological and economic feasibility of safer alternative
design elements).
113. Patterson, 608 F. Supp. at 1212.
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harm to their users and other members of society. " 4
Additionally, the Patterson court rejected the plaintiff's alternative
theory that the manner in which handguns are distributed to the general
public presents an actionable defect. 115 The court first noted that
Texas' products liability law does not recognize any cause of action for
"defective distribution.""11 6 Next, the court stated that even if such a
defect were to be recognized, the manufacturer of a handgun used in a
criminal assault would not be liable to the victim because the criminal's
intentional conduct would preclude a finding that the defect proximately
caused the injury.' '7 The court concluded that the case before it repre-
sented an attempt to ban handguns through an improper use of the judi-
cial system.' ' 8
C. Maryland's "Saturday Night Special" Strict Liability
After examining the law in this area, the Maryland Court of Appeals
in Kelley "9 found both the products liability and ultrahazardous activity
theories inapplicable to the situation in which a party seeks recovery
from a gun manufacturer for injuries resulting from a criminal as-
sault. 120 The Kelley court, however, went on to fashion a unique theory
of strict liability under which manufacturers and sellers of "saturday
night specials" could be held strictly liable to victims of criminal
shootings. 12'
114. See id. The Patterson court stated that expansion of "unconventional"
products liability theories for the purpose of eliminating handguns would not be
logically consistent with the generally accepted proposition that manufacturers
are not insurers against all risks associated with their products. Id. at 1216.
115. Id. at 1215.
116. Id. at 1214; see also Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d
at 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984) (criticizing Richman for "blur[ring] the distinction
between strict liability for selling unreasonably dangerous products and strict lia-
bility for engaging in ultrahazardous activities") (Emphasis in original). But see
Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977) (if jury determines
that risks of marketing slingshots to children outweigh utility of permitting chil-
dren to purchase such items, manufacturer of slingshot may be held liable when
children are injured during use).
117. Patterson, 608 F. Supp. at 1215.
118. Id. at 1215-16. District Judge Buchmeyer stated:
As an individual, I believe, very strongly, that handguns should be banned
and that there should be stringent, effective control of other firearms.
However, as a judge, I know full well that the question of whether handguns can
be sold is a political one, not an issue of products liability law--and that this
is a matter for the legislatures, not the courts.
Id. at 1216 (emphasis in original).
119. 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985).
120. Id. at 132-39, 497 A.2d at 1146-50.
121. Id. at 158-59, 497 A.2d at 1160. The Kelley court stated the elements
of its new cause of action as follows:
[O]nce the trier of fact determines that a handgun is a Saturday Night
Special [based on the gun's size and barrel length plus evidence of low
cost, poor quality, unreliability, and inaccuracy], then liability may be
1603
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In Kelley, an inexpensive .38 caliber pistol was used to injure the
plaintiff in the course of a grocery store robbery. 122 Rejecting tradi-
tional theories of recovery, the Kelley court determined that Maryland
precedent supported the creation of a new cause of action where "mod-
em circumstances or increased knowledge" justify judicial modification
of the common law in a manner consistent with the state's legislatively
articulated public policy.' 23 The court noted that while Maryland's leg-
islative policy supported the manufacture and sale of handguns for gen-
eral legitimate purposes, the manufacture and sale of "saturday night
specials" had not been similarly sanctioned. 124
The court determined that the policies embodied in both the Mary-
land Code 12 5 and the 1968 Federal Gun Control Act 12 6 reflect the view
that "saturday night specials" exist as a sub-species of handguns which
are useless for legitimate purposes. 127 Moreover, the court found that
imposed against a manufacturer or anyone else in the marketing chain,
including the retailer. Liability may only be imposed, however, when
the plaintiff or plaintiff's decedent suffers injury or death because he is
shot with the Saturday Night Special. In addition, the shooting must be
[or occur in the course of] a criminal act.... Although neither contrib-
utory negligence nor assumption of the risk will be recognized as de-
fenses, nevertheless the plaintiff must not be a participant in the
criminal activity. If the foregoing elements are satisfied, then the de-
fendant shall be liable for all resulting damages suffered by the gunshot
victim, consistent with the established law concerning tort damages.
Id. (footnote omitted).
122. Id. at 128-29, 497 A.2d at 1144-45. The pistol's parts were manufac-
tured abroad by Rohm Gesellschaft, a West German corporation, and the gun
was assembled in Miami, Florida by R.G. Industries, a wholly owned subsidiary
of Rohm. Id. at 128, 497 A.2d at 1145. The Kelley court noted that R.G. Indus-
tries "has been called the nation's major producer of Saturday Night Specials."
Id. at 159, 497 A.2d at 1161 (citing Brill, The Traffic (Legal and Illegal) In Guns,
HARPER'S, Sept. 1977, at 39 (describing loophole in 1968 Federal Gun Control
Act which permits importation of parts for domestic assembly of weapons which
are illegal to import under act)).
123. Kelley, 304 Md. at 140-41, 497 A.2d at 1150-51.
124. Id. at 143-45, 497 A.2d at 1151-53. The Kelley court recognized that
the Maryland Code expressly permits possession of handguns in specified situa-
tions. Id. at 144, 497 A.2d at 1152-53; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 36B-36G
(1982 Repl. Vol. & Cum. Supp. 1986). Thus, the court reasoned that Maryland's
legislatively articulated policy generally supports legitimate handgun ownership
and use. This being the case, imposition of strict liability on the manufacturers
of all handguns would be contrary to Maryland public policy. Kelley, 304 Md. at
144, 497 A.2d at 1152-53.
125. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 36B-36G, 441-448 (1982 Repl. Vol. &
Cum. Supp. 1986) (permitting use of handguns for purposes of law enforce-
ment, sporting, and self-defense in Maryland).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 925 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984) (allowing importation of fire-
arms for law enforcement, military, and recreational purposes as regulated by
Secretary of the Treasury); 27 C.F.R. part 178 § 178.112 (regulations delegating
authority to Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to com-
pile importation list of firearms adaptable to sporting purposes).
127. Kelley, 304 Md. at 147-55, 497 A.2d at 1154-58. The court reasoned
that both Maryland's Code and the 1968 Federal Gun Control Act sanction the
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manufacturers of such weapons know or should know that their prod-
ucts are principally used for criminal purposes. 128 Thus, the Kelley court
concluded that it was entirely consistent with both Maryland and federal
public policy to hold manufacturers of "saturday night specials" strictly
liable to innocent crime victims. 12 9
The Kelley court thus created a theory of relief which requires a
plaintiff to convince a court, as a threshold matter, that the handgun
which caused the injury was a "saturday night special."' 30 The court
stated, however, that the issue of whether a handgun was, in fact, a "sat-
urday night special" is generally a jury determination based on factors
such as the gun's size, cost and quality.' 3l The court held that once a
use of handguns for such "legitimate purposes" as police enforcement, sporting
and collecting activities, and self defense. See id. The court stated that "saturday
night specials" are unfit for legitimate uses because they are poorly made, inac-
curate, and unreliable. Id. at 154, 497 A.2d at 1158. The court further stated
that the chief value of low cost, easily concealable, poorly made handguns is as a
tool for perpetrators of violent crimes. Id. The court noted that criminal activi-
ties were "obviously" not legitimate uses for handguns. Id. Thus, the court con-
cluded that neither federal nor applicable state law supported the existence of
"saturday night specials." Id. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158.
128. Id. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158. The court quoted the following state-
ment from a magazine article, purportedly made by a sales representative of
R.G. Industries to a gun shop owner, as follows: " 'If your store is anywhere
near a ghetto area, these ought to sell real well. This is most assuredly a ghetto
gun.' " Id. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158 (quoting Brill, supra note 122, at 40). Fi-
nally, the court relied on a law review article to support its major premise that
"saturday night specials" are primarily used for criminal purposes and that any
countervailing social usefulness they might have is negligible. Kelley, 304 Md. at
155-56, 497 A.2d at 1158-59 (citing Note, Manufacturers' Liability to Victims of
Handgun Crime: A Common Law Approach, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 771, 791-92
(1983)).
129. Kelley, 304 Md. at 157, 497 A.2d at 1159. Cf Moning v. Alfonso, 400
Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977)(manufacturer of slingshots could be held
liable for foreseeable misuse where dangerous product target marketed and dis-
tributed directly to children). For a discussion of "defective distribution" as a
basis of strict products liability, see supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
130. Kelley, 304 Md. at 158, 497 A.2d at 1160. The Kelley court stated that a
trial court may not consider size and barrel length alone when determining
whether a plaintiff has met the initial burden of demonstrating that a gun is a
"saturday night special." Id. at 158, 497 A.2d at 1160. Rather, the trial court
must also consider evidence of a handgun's cost, quality or other "identifying
characteristics" before allowing the issue to go before the jury. Id.
131. Id. at 157-58, 497 A.2d at 1160. The court developed criteria for
courts and juries to use to determine whether a particular handgun is a "satur-
day night special" so as to impose the new strict liability standard on the manu-
facturer or seller of such gun:
There is no clear-cut, established definition of a Saturday Night
Special, although there are various characteristics which are considered
in placing a handgun into that category. Relevent factors include the
gun's barrel length, concealability, quality of materials, quality of man-
ufacture, accuracy, reliability, whether it has been banned from import
by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and other related
characteristics [including industry standards and public perception]....
Because many of these factors are relative, in a tort suit a handgun
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plaintiff proves that a "saturday night special" caused injury or death in
the course of a criminal act in which the shooting victim was not a crimi-
nal participant, then anyone in the marketing chain of that particular
gun can be held strictly liable for all resulting damages suffered by the
gunshot victim. 1 3 2 The court expressly prohibited the use of contribu-
tory negligence or assumption of risk as defenses to this new cause of
action. 133 The court, however, declined to decide whether the handgun
at issue was, in fact, a "saturday night special."' 3 4
III. ANALYSIS
The major issue presented to the courts in the foregoing cases is
whether handgun manufacturers have a cognizable legal duty to prevent
criminal use of their products. 13 5 An underlying, yet equally important
should rarely, if ever, be deemed a Saturday Night Special as a matter
of law. Instead, it is a finding to be made by the trier of facts.
Id. at 157-58, 497 A.2d at 1159-60.
132. Id. at 158-59, 497 A.2d at 1160. The court designated the ruling to
apply in the Kelley case and to all causes of action arising from the criminal use of
"saturday night specials" which were first marketed prospective to the mandate.
Id. at 161-62, 497 A.2d at 1161-62. The Maryland Court of Appeals noted the
possible unfairness inherent in applying its new theory of liability to all causes of
action accruing after Kelley, stating:
The gist of the wrongful act on the part of the manufacturers and mar-
keters of Saturday Night Specials, underlying the cause of action, is the
marketing of such guns to the public, knowing that they have little or
no legitimate use and foreseeing that the product's chief use is for crim-
inal activity. While manufacturers and marketers of handguns have or
should have had such knowledge for a long time, nevertheless until
now they have had little reason to anticipate that their actions might
result in tort liability.... Consequently, when a Saturday Night Special
has been first marketed to a member of the public prior to the date of
our mandate in this case, but the cause of action accrues after the date
of the mandate, there may be some basis for the defendant manufactur-
ers and marketers to complain of unfairness.
Id. at 161-62, 497 A.2d at 1162. Recognizing this potential unfairness, the court
held that its new theory of liability would
apply to all ... causes of action accruing after the date of our mandate
... unless it is shown that the initial marketing of the Saturday Night
Special . . .occurred prior to the date of the mandate. In such event,
the basis for liability recognized [in this case] will not apply, even
though the gunshot injury took place after our mandate.
Id. at 162, 497 A.2d at 1162 (footnote omitted). While noting this unfairness,
the court nonetheless held that its new theory of liability would apply to the
defendant in Kelley, even though that defendant had no reason to anticipate any
tort liability, the gun at issue having been both marketed and misused before the
court laid down its mandate. Id. The court rationalized that ordinarily in cases
such as Kelley, it is proper to "apply the change [in common law principles] to
the case before us and prospectively to all such causes of action accruing after
the date of the case before us." Id. at 161, 497 A.2d 1161-62.
133. Id. at 159, 497 A.2d at 1160.
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Richman v. Charter Arms Corp., 571 F. Supp. 192, 208 (E.D.
1606 [Vol. 31: p. 1577
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issue concerns the respective roles of courts and legislatures in imposing
standards of care on gun manufacturers with respect to this duty.13 6 It
is submitted that handgun manufacturers should not be immune from
liability to shooting victims who can demonstrate that their injuries were
proximately caused by a gun manufacturer's breach of a legal duty owed
to the victim. It is suggested, however, that manufacturers of non-defec-
tive firearms have no legal duty to compensate shooting victims under
"ultrahazardous activity" 13 7 or strict products liability law.13 8
La. 1983) ("The critical question here is: What are the legal limits of a handgun
manufacturer's liability for the criminal acts of third persons?").
136. See id. (discussing related roles of judges and legislators in Louisiana
jurisprudence).
137. For a discussion of cases rejecting the application of the ul-
trahazardous activity doctrine to the manufacture and distribution of handguns,
see supra notes 47-66 and accompanying text. It is submitted that the courts in
these decisions have properly refused to extend strict liability under the ul-
trahazardous activity doctrine to the manufacture of products which can be used
in an abnormally dangerous manner. These courts are in agreement with the
view that manufacturers should not be subject to this absolute form of liability
unless the very act of manufacturing or handling of the product is itself ex-
tremely dangerous. See, e.g., Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304 Md. 124, 133-34, 497
A.2d 1143, 1147 (1985) (listing cases in accord on proposition that abnormally
dangerous activity doctrine is not applicable to manufacture and distribution of
handguns). Thus, it is suggested that the courts which have addressed the issue
have properly distinguished the relatively safe act of manufacturing a small con-
cealable handgun from the ultimate ultrahazardous act of shooting it. See Martin
v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Illinois
has never imposed liability upon a non-negligent manufacturer of a product that
is not defective.") It is submitted that preserving this distinction is necessary to
avoid a socially undesirable manipulation of the ultrahazardous activity doctrine
to make manufacturers of patently dangerous products insurers against all risks
associated with the use of their products. Cf. id. at 1205 (suggesting enterprise
liability theory holding "that whenever someone is injured there must be some-
one also answerable in damages" would be socially undesireable and could lead
to significant discouragement of new manufacturing ventures).
138. For a discussion of cases rejecting the application of strict product lia-
bility law to hold handgun manufacturers liable to shooting victims, see supra
notes 87-120 and accompanying text. It is submitted that the existing frame-
work of strict products liability law serves well to regulate the quality rather than
the type of new products that enter the consumer market, irrespective of the
product's overall social utility. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
comment i (1966). Courts and commentators have repeatedly emphasized that
this theory of liability does not force manufacturers to insure against all risks
flowing from the use of their products. See supra note 113 and accompanying
text. Moreover, the drafters of the Second Restatement state explicitly that strict
liability under § 402A should not be applied in situations where a dangerous
product's risks are obvious to the consuming public. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A comment i (1966).
It is submitted that properly functioning handguns are analagous to the Sec-
ond Restatement's "good whiskey." They are obviously and inherently dangerous
in that they are designed specifically to propel a projectile with lethal force. See,
e.g., Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1212 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Note,
Handguns and Products Liability supra note 13, at 1916. If handguns malfunction
and cause injury due to a design defect or manufacturing flaw, § 402A is clearly
applicable. See, e.g., Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 375 So. 2d 151 (La. App.
1607
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It is further respectfully submitted that the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals in Kelley, 139 overstepped the bounds of its judicial role by relying
exclusively on out-of-court factual assertions to legally define a pro-
scribed class of handguns and by imposing a new form of strict liability
on manufacturers of guns which fit into this proscribed class. 140 It is
suggested that while it is certainly proper for the legislature to regulate
handguns on the basis of information obtained through legislative dis-
course, it was not proper for the Maryland Court of Appeals to do this
within the judicial forum-particularly when both the federal and Mary-
land legislatures have declined to define and restrict production of "sat-
urday night specials" after considering the same factual assertions relied
upon by the Kelley court.
Where the legislature has acted on an issue of social policy, the
courts are bound to interpret and enforce the mandates of the legisla-
ture, subject, of course, to constitutional limitations. 14 1 However, on
issues for which the legislature has not specifically enacted statutory
rights and duties, the courts may recognize and enforce existing or
newly created common law rules to achieve a desirable social result. 142
Violations of such rules are then redressable in common law tort ac-
tions. 143 Since the issue of whether it is socially acceptable to manufac-
ture crime-prone handguns has been left open by the legislatures, it may
be proper in certain circumstances for courts to resolve this issue by
creating common law duties affecting handgun manufacturers. 144 How-
1979) (gun manufacturer strictly liable for injury caused by malfunction of safety
due to defect in design and manufacture), aff'd, 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1980).
However, in the absence of "something wrong" with the product, the law of
products liability does not hold handgun manufacturers strictly liable to shoot-
ing victims. See generally Wade, supra note 80, at 825, 830-38 (analyzing defec-
tiveness in terms of requirement of "something wrong" with product); W.
PROSSER, supra note 24, at 659 ("There must ... be something wrong with the
product which makes it unreasonably dangerous to those who come in contact
with it [to generate strict liability]."). It is thus submitted that the courts in the
foregoing handgun cases properly rejected the attempt of handgun control ad-
vocates to manipulate the framework of strict products liability law in order to
regulate what type of handgun should reach the consumer marketplace.
139. Kelley, 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985). For a discussion of the
Kelley case, see supra notes 119-34 and infra notes 154-56, 159 & 161 and accom-
panying text.
140. For a collection of articles discussing the interaction of the courts and
the legislatures in making and administering laws and public policy, see gener-
ally R. GAMBITrA, M. MAY, & J. FOSTER, GOVERNING THROUGH COURTS
(1981)[hereinafter cited as R. GAMBrrTA & M. MAY].
141. See R. GAMBrrA & M. MAY, supra note 140, at 9-10.
142. See generally id. at 9-16; see also W. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 15 ("There
is good reason... [for courts] to make a conscious effort to direct the law along
the lines which will achieve a desirable social result, both for the present and the
future.").
143. W. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 15.
144. Cf Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 436, 254 N.W.2d 759, 764
(1977) ("The Legislature has not approved or disapproved the manufacture of
1608 [Vol. 31: p. 1577
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ever, it is submitted that in order to hold handgun manufacturers liable
to shooting victims, such manufacturers must have committed some
form of tort.
Dean Prosser has described a tort as "conduct which is twisted, or
crooked, not straight."14 5 In practice, courts determine whether specific
acts are tortious by reference to objective standards of reasonable con-
duct. 146 Where an individual is called to account for unreasonable con-
duct, the applicable standard of care is based on an assessment of what
an ordinary, reasonable prudent person would have done under the fac-
tual circumstances of the case. 14 7 In all cases where reasonable people
could differ as to the tortious nature of an act, principles of fairness sug-
gest that the actor have the opportunity to try, before an unbiased
factfinder, the issue of whether the applicable standard of care was
breached. 148
It is submitted that in the absence of a legislative mandate, and in
the absence of applicable traditional strict liability theories, the proper
slingshots and their marketing directly to children; the Court perforce must de-
cide what the common law rule shall be."
145. W. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 2 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 6.
147. Id. at 150-51. However, where an entity, such as a manufacturing cor-
poration is the alleged tortfeasor, an objective standard is based on the reasona-
bleness of the entity's act with respect to the risks and benefits created by the
act. See, e.g., The TJ. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). In Hooper, Judge
Learned Hand held that it was unreasonable for a tug boat operator not to sup-
ply all of its boats with radio receivers, despite the lack of a general custom to do
so. Id. at 740. Judge Hand reasoned that "[a]n adequate receiving set ... [is
available] at small cost and is reasonably reliable if kept up; obviously it is a source
of great protection to [the] tows." Id. at 739 (emphasis added). The decision in
Hooper foreshadowed the enunciation of the "Hand Formula" in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). In Carroll Towing, Judge Hand
stated:
Since there are occasions when every vessel will break from her moor-
ings, and since, if she does, she becomes a menace to those about her;
the owner's duty, as in other situations, to provide against resulting
injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that she will
break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the
burden of adequate precautions.
Id. at 173. Judge Hand went on to express his rule as an algebraic equation in
which the burden of adequate precautions was directly proportional to the
probability and potential gravity of the resulting injuries. Id.
148. See, e.g., Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977).
The Moning court stated that the issue of whether selling slingshots to children
was reasonable conduct was a jury question because:
Reasonable persons can differ on the balance of utility and risk,
and whether marketing slingshots directly to children creates an unrea-
sonable risk of harm;
The interest of children in ready-market access to slingshots is not
so clearly entitled to absolute protection in comparison with the inter-
est of persons who face the risk thereby created. ...
Id. at 434, 254 N.W.2d at 763. For a discussion of the Moning decision, see infra
notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
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manner in which to determine whether the manufacture of "saturday
night specials" is a tortious activity is to present the issue before a
factfinder in the context of a traditional negligence action. 1 49 The plain-
tiff in such a case would bear the burden of proving that a handgun
maker unreasonably introduced a weapon into the stream of commerce
which was designed and target marketed for criminal use and which, in
turn, proximately resulted in the shooting victim's injury. 150
It is submitted that a plaintiff could establish, using relevant statisti-
cal evidence, that marketing the type of handgun at issue created a circle
of foreseeable risk which imputed a legal duty on the part of the manu-
facturers to take reasonable steps to avoid distributing their products to
crime-prone purchasers. 151 This plaintiff would then need to prove that
the handgun manufacturer's marketing practices combined with a fore-
seeable criminal use to proximately cause injury to the shooting vic-
tim. 152 To support the issue of foreseeability, the plaintiff would be
required to introduce evidence that the manufacturer knew or should
have known that the handgun it sold to the public was prone to criminal
use. 153 In the foregoing cause of action, the focus would be on whether
149. Cf id.
150. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 208-11 (discussing burdens
of proof and presumptions in negligence cases).
151. Cf Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977). In Mon-
ing, the court concluded that a boy injured by his friend's use of a slingshot was a
"foreseeable plaintiff" with respect to the manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer
who could be expected to anticipate that such an event would take place. Id. at
439-40, 254 N.W.2d at 765; see also Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339,
344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928) ("The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the
duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation: it is risk to another or to others
within the range of apprehension .... "). In the context of a negligence action
by a shooting victim against a handgun manufacturer, the plaintiff could present
evidence to demonstrate that the gun at issue enjoyed great popularity as an
instrument of crime while having little or no countervailing social utility.
152. See W. PROSSER, supra note 24, at 272-76 (discussing foreseeable inter-
vening causes). Courts have often stated as a general rule that criminal acts of
third parties which combine with a defendant's negligent act to cause injury are
presumed to be unforeseeable. See, e.g., Martin, 743 F.2d at 1205 ("criminal mis-
use of firearms . . . is not reasonably foreseeable."). For additional cases sup-
porting this proposition, see supra note 56. However, in cases where it can be
reasonably anticipated that a negligent act will set the stage for a subsequent
criminal act, the chain of proximate causation will not be broken. See, e.g.,
Franco v. Bunyard, 261 Ark. 144, 147, 547 S.W.2d 91, 93 (since criminal use of
gun by convict was foreseeable, seller of gun was not relieved of liability for
injury caused by convict), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977); Brauer v. N.Y. Cent.
& H.R.R., 91 N.J.L. 190, 193, 103 A. 166, 169 (1918) (railroad not insulated
from liability for property stolen at scene of urban grade crossing accident).
153. The Kelley court noted a magazine article in which a sales representa-
tive for a handgun manufacturer allegedly told a gun store owner: "If your store
is anywhere near a ghetto area, these [small, inexpensive handguns] ought to
sell real well. This is most assuredly a ghetto gun .... [B]etween you and me,
this [similar model] is such a piece of crap I'd be afraid to fire the thing." Kelley,
304 Md. at 155, 497 A.2d at 1158 (quoting Brill, supra note 122, at 40).
1610 [Vol. 3 1: p. 157 7
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the conduct of the gun manufacturer was unreasonable, rather than
whether its product was socially undesirable. Thus, where a preponder-
ance of the evidence at trial established that a handgun manufacturer
designed, promoted, and distributed small, inexpensive handguns in
such a manner as to capitalize on the demand for the product in high
crime areas, it would be entirely consistent with existing tort law princi-
ples to find such a manufacturer liable to the victims of its criminal
customers.
It is respectfully submitted that the Maryland Court of Appeals in
Kelley ignored this approach and improperly focused its analysis on the
social utility of the handgun manufacturer's product in order to create a
cause of action analagous to that of strict product liability and to avoid
burdening shooting-victim plaintiffs with the proof problems inherent in
a negligence cause of action. It is suggested that the Kelley court im-
properly relied primarily on commentary and legislative proceedings to
determine that small handguns with certain characteristics have no legit-
imate social utility despite the fact that no plaintiff has yet proven by a
preponderance of evidence that a factual basis exists to support the
Maryland Court of Appeals' decision. 154 Therefore, it is respectfully
submitted that the Kelley court's enumerated physical characteristics
which make certain handguns "anti-social" should not form a basis of
strict liability for gun manufacturers. 155 It is suggested that the court
thus inappropriately fashioned a theory of relief ultimately designed to
eliminate production of small, inexpensive handguns. 156
By contrast, it is suggested that the proper analysis for determining
a handgun manufacturer's liability can be found in Moning v A4lfono. 15 7
In Moning, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that, in the absence
of a controlling legislative mandate, the issue of whether a slingshot
manufacturer was negligent in marketing its dangerous product to chil-
dren was dependent on a jury determination that such deliberate market-
ing practices constituted unreasonable conduct.' 5 8 The Moning court
did not determine which physical characteristics make slingshots socially
undesirable. Rather, the court concluded that if a jury found that the
dangers associated with certain slingshots outweighed their social utility
as childrens' playtoys, then the manufacturer could be held liable for
154. See id. The Kelley court had no trial record to work with since the issue
came before it on questions of law certified by the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland on the defendant's pre-trial motion for dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Id. at 129, 497 A.2d at
1145.
155. See id. at 147-57, 497 A.2d at 1154-59.
156. Id. at 157-59, 497 A.2d at 1159-60.
157. 400 Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977). In Moning, the plaintiff was a
12-year-old boy who was injured by an inexpensive slingshot product which was
marketed for sale to small children. Id. at 432, 254 N.W.2d at 762.
158. Id. at 432-36, 254 N.W.2d at 762-64.
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injuries associated with their use.' 59
It is submitted that the Moning decision, unlike the Kelley decision,
adhered to the traditional principles of fairness which permit adverse
parties to argue the reasonableness of the defendants' conduct in a trial
setting before a neutral factfinder. By contrast, it is suggested that the
Kelley court inappropriately developed a court-made standard of conduct
based strictly on the qualities of the product before any fact-finder had
the opportunity to determine whether the marketing practices of the
manufacturer constituted unreasonable conduct. Additionally, under
the Kelley court's new theory, such review by a factfinder will never occur
because the focus of the new cause of action is on the quality of the
handgun-that is to say, whether the handgun falls within the court's
proscribed class. Since this new cause of action is one of strict liability,
the reasonableness of the manufacturer's marketing practices is neither
a defense, nor a focus of the plaintiff's proof at trial. 160
It is submitted that the legislative process has not produced a ban
on the manfacture and sale of specific types of handguns because a ma-
jority of legislators has not been persuaded that the dangers associated
with such weapons outweigh their social utility. 161 This is so despite the
fact that these legislators have been confronted with the same evidence
and opinion relied upon by the Kelley court to support its conclusion that
"Saturday Night Specials are largely unfit for any of the recognized le-
gitimate uses sanctioned by ... Maryland gun control legislation." 162 It
is further suggested that the evidence presented in the legislative debate
has not provided a factual basis on which legislators could properly de-
fine and ban specific "anti-social" forms of handguns. 163 In particular,
it is submitted that although there may exist a consensus that the out-
standing number of "saturday night specials" should be reduced, 16 4
there is, in fact, insufficient evidence to enable legislators to determine
which, if any, existing forms of handguns fit into this category. 165
159. Id.
160. For a discussion of the elements of the new strict liability cause of
action enunciated in Kelley, see supra notes 118-33 and accompanying text.
161. See generally McClain, supra note 2, at 217 (concluding "that there is
little agreement on the potential impact of national legislation banning the man-
ufacture and distribution of ['saturday night specials'].
162. Kelley, 304 Md. at 154, 497 A.2d at 1158.
163. See McClain, supra note 2, at 202-04 (illustrating difficulties of defining
"saturday night specials" in order to implement policy decisions aimed at curb-
ing gun violence).
164. See Draper, supra note 4, at 5 ("In this survey of current opinion on the
issue of gun control, no disagreement was found on the need to stem the in-
creasing volume of handgun violence and also to keep down the rising number
of Saturday Night Specials in society.").
165. See Bruce-Briggs, supra note 2, at 22-24 (arguing that a precise defini-
tion of "saturday night specials" is impossible to reach but "[c]oncentration on
'Saturday Night Specials' has definite political advantages").
1612 [Vol. 31: p. 1577
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IV. CONCLUSION
Thus, it is submitted that the Maryland Court of Appeals in Kelley
improperly circumvented the traditional approach of deferring the es-
tablishment ofjudicial standards of conduct until there is a "background
of experience out of which the standards have emerged."' 16 6 This note
concludes that the Kelley court improperly established court-made stan-
dards of conduct for the handgun industry before any handgun manu-
facturers had the opportunity to adjudicate in front of a neutral
factfinder the issue of whether their marketing practices are reasonable.
This note also suggests that legislatures' general reluctance to regulate
the manufacture of handguns when confronted with the same evidence
available to the Maryland Court of Appeals supports the conclusion that
the Kelley holding does not in fact reflect current social policy.
Finally, this note suggests that the proper manner to establish judi-
cial standards of conduct for handgun manufacturers is to allow shoot-
ing-victim plaintiffs to seek redress only in common law negligence
actions against the manufacturers.' 6 7 By proving that the gun that in-
jured them was designed and target marketed to "high risk" population
segments, these plaintiffs may convince factfinders that the defendant
gun manufacturer acted negligently, having actual or imputed knowl-
edge of the potential risks to the plaintiff.168 Thus, the focus of the
166. Pokora v. Wabash R.R., 292 U.S. 98, 105 (1934). In Pokora, the plain-
tiff was injured while driving his truck across defendant's four track grade cross-
ing. Id. at 99-100. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of defendant on the
basis that plaintiffs' failure to get out of his truck to check for oncoming trains
before crossing the tracks made him contributorily negligent under the standard
of care enunciated in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman. 292 U.S. at 99 (citing
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927) (requiring driver to
stop vehicle, get out, look, and listen for train before crossing tracks)). Justice
Cardozo criticized strict adherence to the standard set forth in Goodman and cau-
tioned that court-set standards of care should yield to actual determinations of
reasonable conduct:
Standards of prudent conduct are declared at times by courts, but
they are taken over from the facts of life. [In this case, the driver could
have subjected himself to a greater risk of harm by leaving his vehicle,
in accordance with Goodman.]....
Illustrations such as these bear witness to the need for caution in
framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law. The need is
the more urgent when there is no background of experience out of
which the standards have emerged. They are then, not the natural
flowerings of behavior in its customary forms, but rules artificially de-
veloped, and imposed from without. Extraordinary situations may not
wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or regulations that are fitting for
the common-place or normal. In default of the guide of customary con-
duct, what is suitable for the traveler caught in a mesh where the ordi-
nary safeguards fail him is for the judgment of a jury.
Id. at 104-06 (citations omitted).
167. For a discussion of the application of traditional, straightforward neg-
ligence principles to the issue of handgun manufacturers' liability to shooting
victims, see supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
168. Cf Franco v. Bunyard, 261 Ark. 144, 547 S.W.2d 91 (gun dealer negli-
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courts' approach to dealing with the sensitive issue of gun control
should be on the conduct of parties responsible for gun violence. If a
gun manufacturer's conduct is determined to unreasonably add to the
proliferation of violent crime-such as where small, concealable, cheap
handguns are target marketed 16 9 to criminals-then there is no basis for
shielding that manufacturer from liability to shooting victims. However,
in the absence of such a determination by a neutral factfinder in a com-
mon law negligence action, the courts should concentrate their efforts
on imposing maximum available penal sanctions against the criminals
themselves, who are the direct cause of violent crime. Unless a gun
manufacturer is found to have acted negligently or recklessly, it is im-
proper for courts to attempt to regulate the production of small, inex-
pensive handguns by shifting the burden of criminal handgun use onto
gun manufacturers.
Nicholas j Caggiano
gently sold gun to escaped convict who subsequently shot plaintiffs' decedents),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977).
169. Target marketing generally involves using demographic statistics to
identify the purchasing needs of specific sub-groups of consumers. See E. Mc-
CARTHY BASIC MARKETING, A MANAGERIAL APPROACH 37-41 (1960). Products
may then be designed, advertised, priced, packaged, and distributed to specifi-
cally suit the needs of the target market. Id. Applying these principles to "satur-
day night specials," it is submitted that if a plaintiff could prove that a handgun
manufacturer specifically and intentionally target marketed small, inexpensive
handguns to the criminal element as a product designed to facilitate their illegal
activities, then such conduct would be unreasonable. Cf Moning v. Alfono, 400
Mich. 425, 434, 254 N.W.2d 759, 763 (1977) (manufacturer that marketed 10-
cent slingshots to children as toys may have acted unreasonably).
1614 [Vol. 31: p. 1577
38
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 5 [1986], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss5/9
